“Success Is Invisible, But Failure Is Public”: Examining The U.S. Office Of Personnel Management Data Records Breach by Lin, Zeyi
“SUCCESS IS INVISIBLE, BUT FAILURE IS PUBLIC”1: 
EXAMINING THE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT DATA 
RECORDS BREACH 
 
 
 
 
 
Zeyi Lin 
 
 
 
 
TC 660H 
Plan II Honors Program 
The University of Texas at Austin 
 
 
 
 
May 10, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Prof. Robert M. Chesney 
James A. Baker Chair and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, School of Law 
Director, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law 
Supervising Professor 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________ 
Dr. William H. Press 
Warren J. and Viola M. Raymer Chair 
Department of Computer Science and Integrative Biology 
Second Reader 
                                                 
1 This phrase comes from Susan Hennessey, managing editor of the national security-focused online publication 
Lawfare, in a cybersecurity review essay published in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs. In this essay, 
Hennessey contextualizes the 2015 cyberattack on the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) alongside the 
greater deterrence strategy of cyberspace with this quote. Indeed, success in cybersecurity is hard to appreciate until 
it is gone, usually in the most public of circumstances.  
  
 i 
Acknowledgements 
First, I would like to thank my family and friends for their love and support. 
 
Next, I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Bobby Chesney, and my second reader, Dr. Bill 
Press, who provided me with excellent guidance as I navigated through this thesis process. I 
would like to especially thank Prof. Chesney for instilling in me an academic interest in 
cybersecurity and policy. I am also very appreciative of Dr. Press, whose meticulous edits 
helped sharpen the language of this document. 
 
 ii 
Abstract 
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Title: “Success is Invisible, but Failure is Public”: Examining the U.S. 
Office of Personnel Management Data Records Breach 
 
Supervising Professor: Prof. Robert M. Chesney, The University of Texas School of Law and 
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 In 2015, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) suffered one of the largest 
government-related data breaches in U.S. history. A total of 4.2 million personnel records, 21.5 
million background check records, and 5.6 million sets of fingerprints were exfiltrated in a 
sophisticated, multi-stage cyber espionage operation linked to state-sponsored actors. Such a 
large data breach invited bipartisan criticism of the agency’s handling of the incidents and 
thrust the federal government’s cybersecurity preparedness into the limelight. 
 
This paper seeks to answer a set of five interrelated questions: 1) What happened in the 
2015 U.S. Office of Personnel Management Data breach, and what were the impacts? 2) Did a 
lack of technical capability hinder OPM’s efforts to detect and block unauthorized access to its 
network? 3) Were organizational and management weaknesses more to blame? 4) Did the 
cybersecurity posture at OPM before the incidents change after the events in 2014 and 2015? 5) 
What can be done by the Office of Personnel Management to prevent or mitigate the damage 
from similar cyber activities in the future? 
 
 To answer these questions, this paper first introduces the concept of the “cybersecurity 
toolkit” to better understand contemporary cyber issues. Second, the OPM case study is 
discussed, including a timeline of events and key actors. Third, this paper examines the 
technical, management, and compliance-related factors that contributed to the breaches, 
including a compilation and analysis of OPM Inspector General cybersecurity audit data from 
2007 to 2017. Finally, this paper discusses the short- and long-term impacts of the OPM breach 
and offers recommendations to improve cybersecurity at OPM and within the federal 
government.
   
iii 
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................... i 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................................... ii 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................... iii 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 1 
Thesis Questions and Scope ................................................................................................................. 3 
Methodology .......................................................................................................................................... 4 
Part One: The Cybersecurity Toolkit .................................................................................................... 7 
1.1. Different Views of Cybersecurity ................................................................................................. 8 
1.1.1 Offensive versus Defensive Elements.......................................................................................... 9 
1.1.2 Public Sector versus Private Sector Efforts .............................................................................. 10 
1.2. The Cybersecurity Dilemma ....................................................................................................... 10 
1.2.1 OPM Breach Attribution in the Nascent Status Quo .............................................................. 12 
1.2.2 The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Taking the Defensive Perspective .............................................. 13 
1.3 Contextualizing Cybersecurity in the U.S. Federal Government ........................................... 15 
1.3.1. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 ................................................ 16 
1.3.2. Cybersecurity in the Rest of the U.S. Government .................................................................. 17 
Part Two: The OPM Case Study ........................................................................................................... 20 
2.1. About the U.S. Office of Personnel Management .................................................................... 20 
2.1.1. The Mission of OPM ................................................................................................................ 20 
2.1.2. OPM Leadership and Organizational Structure ..................................................................... 21 
2.1.3. Information Technology Systems Architecture at OPM ......................................................... 23 
2.2. Timeline of Events ........................................................................................................................ 24 
2.2.1. Burgeoning Intrusions ............................................................................................................. 25 
2.2.2. Command and Control ............................................................................................................. 26 
2.2.3. OPM Contractors Breached ..................................................................................................... 27 
2.2.4. OPM Manuals Breach Draws Public Attention ..................................................................... 28 
2.2.5. Attackers “Tap the Mother Lode” ............................................................................................ 29 
2.2.6. Discovery.................................................................................................................................. 30 
2.2.7. Immediate Fallout .................................................................................................................... 32 
2.2.8. Later Developments and OPM Today ..................................................................................... 33 
2.3 Notable Actors ............................................................................................................................... 35 
2.3.1. Defensive: U.S. Federal Government Agencies ....................................................................... 35 
2.3.2. Defensive: Affected Federal Contractors in Background Investigations and Healthcare ........ 38 
2.3.3. Offensive: Chinese-Government Backed Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) ...................... 39 
iv 
 
2.3.4. Relationship between Actors .................................................................................................... 41 
Part Three: Diagnostics of the OPM Failure ...................................................................................... 42 
3.1. Overview of Technical Elements behind the OPM Data Breaches ........................................ 42 
3.1.1. The Axiom Group and HiKit Malware in the “Manuals” Breach .......................................... 43 
3.1.2. Contractor Access and Permissions in the Second Data Breach.............................................. 44 
3.1.3. DeepPanda’s Command and Control: PlugX and Sakula Family of Malware ........................ 45 
3.2: Policy, Personnel, and Management Elements Leading to the Incidents ............................. 47 
3.2.1. Lack of IT Leadership and Missed Warnings ........................................................................... 48 
3.2.2. Inadequate Implementation of Multifactor Authentication ..................................................... 49 
3.2.3. Data Management Policy Issues .............................................................................................. 50 
3.3 In Context: Historical OPM Cybersecurity Preparedness and Posture ................................. 52 
3.3.1. Agency Privacy Program ......................................................................................................... 56 
3.3.2. Configuration Management ..................................................................................................... 57 
3.3.3. Contingency Planning ............................................................................................................. 58 
3.3.4. Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) .......................................................... 59 
3.3.5. Incident Response Program ..................................................................................................... 62 
3.3.6. Information Security Continuous Monitoring ........................................................................ 63 
3.3.7. Information Security Governance ............................................................................................ 64 
3.3.8. Risk Management .................................................................................................................... 65 
3.3.9. Security Assessment and Authorization .................................................................................. 67 
3.3.10. Security Training ................................................................................................................... 68 
3.3.11. Current Open Recommendations ........................................................................................... 69 
3.4. Evaluation of Technical, Management, and Compliance Factors .......................................... 71 
Part Four: Lessons Learned and Future Recommendations ............................................................ 74 
4.1. Short-Term Impact of the OPM Data Breaches ........................................................................ 74 
4.1.1. Lost Data .................................................................................................................................. 74 
4.1.2. Political Ramifications ............................................................................................................. 76 
4.1.3. Monetary Costs ........................................................................................................................ 77 
4.1.4. International Relations Impacts ............................................................................................... 78 
4.2. Long-Term Implications of the Incidents .................................................................................. 79 
4.2.1. Lagging Federal Background Check Performance .................................................................... 79 
4.2.2. Stolen Data Has Not Been Shared or Sold ............................................................................... 80 
4.2.3. Counterintelligence Implications ............................................................................................. 81 
4.3. Recent Federal Government Cybersecurity Policies ................................................................ 82 
4.3.1. Obama Administration Initiatives ........................................................................................... 82 
v 
 
4.3.2. Trump Administration Continuity.......................................................................................... 83 
4.4. Recommendations for Future Cybersecurity Preparedness ................................................... 84 
Recommendation 1: Prioritize Implementation of Oldest Open OIG FISMA Recommendations . 84 
Recommendation 2: Develop Security Best Practices through Continuous Improvement ............ 85 
Recommendation 3: Evolve the Contractor Relationship ............................................................... 85 
Recommendation 4: Restructure IT Security Training Programs ................................................. 85 
Recommendation 5: Develop Public-Private Partnerships for Information Sharing ..................... 86 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 87 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................ 89 
Appendix I: OPM Organizational Chart .......................................................................................... 109 
Appendix II: Historical Dataset of OPM OIG FISMA Recommendations ................................ 110 
Appendix III: Recommendations for OPM ...................................................................................... 117 
About the Author .................................................................................................................................. 118 
 
  
  
  
 1 
Introduction 
Imagine that you are an American citizen attempting to gain a security clearance for a 
national security position within the U.S. federal government. Integral to the application 
process of acquiring any security clearance to handle any classified information is the 
completion of Standard Form 86, or the SF-86. Beyond the cursory personally identifiable 
information and biographical details required by the SF-86, such as Social Security Number, 
U.S. passport information, citizenship, past addresses, among other, the form also asks for 
extremely sensitive details of your private life to minimize the risk of your compromise to 
foreign agents or governments. It asks for people who know you well; your marital status; and 
all of your foreign business, professional activities, and contacts. The SF-86 then digs deeper, 
asking about your psychological and emotional health, any illegal use of drugs or drug activity, 
and your financial record. When you complete the last page and send the SF-86 in, these details 
are then processed by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the federal agency that 
manages the U.S. government’s civilian workforce. You, along with millions of others seeking 
positions of national security importance, trust this veritable list of immensely personal details 
in the hands of the federal government, for the immense potential personal, financial, and 
psychological damage caused if these personal details were to be leaked, stolen, altered, or 
otherwise breached, would be catastrophic. 
Unfortunately, as OPM discovered in investigating a breach of its systems in June 2015, 
several million records were stolen by hackers in multiple incidents from as early as 2014. Such 
a heist was one of the largest made against the U.S. federal government in its history, and the 
failures leading up to the breach suggested that the OPM was caught off guard.2 On June 4, 
                                                 
2 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In 
Brief, by Kristin Finklea, Michelle D. Christensen, Eric A. Fischer, Susan V. Lawrence, and Catherine A. Theohary. 
R44111, July 17, 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44111.pdf, 1.  
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2015, OPM announced that the personnel data of approximately 4.2 million current and former 
federal employees were compromised in a cyber incident discovered earlier that year and 
offered to provide “credit report access, credit monitoring, and identity theft insurance and 
recovery services to potentially affected individuals” for the following 18 months.3 Five days 
later, OPM announced that an incident from late May, 2015, resulted in a breach of the sensitive 
background investigation information of 21.5 million individuals, including Social Security 
Numbers, residency and education history, employment history, criminal, and financial history, 
among many other highly sensitive personal details.4 Of the 21.5 million records stolen, 19.7 
million records contained data of “current, former, and prospective employees and contractors 
who applied for a background investigation in 2000 and after.”5 The other 1.8 million records were 
of non-applicants “married or otherwise cohabitating with background investigation 
applications.”6 Furthermore, OPM later confirmed the loss of 5.6 million fingerprint records. 
Malicious cyber activities against OPM date as far back as March 2014, when a 
contractor for OPM handling U.S. security clearance background clearances was allegedly 
breached by Chinese hackers.7 Just three months later, in July, 2014, OPM networks containing 
information of applicants for Top Secret clearances were breached. The sheer volume of data 
loss by the government agency handling federal employee personnel data, background check 
records, and other personally identifiable information raises several questions about how 
                                                 
3 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “OPM to Notify Employees of Cybersecurity Incident,” OPM.gov, June 4, 
2015, https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/06/opm-to-notify-employees-of-cybersecurity-incident/.   
4 U.S. Office of Personnel Management. Office of Communications, “OPM Announces Steps to Protect Federal 
Workers and Others from Cyber Threats,” OPM.gov, June 9, 2015, 
https://www.opm.gov/news/releases/2015/07/opm-announces-steps-to-protect-federal-workers-and-others-from-
cyber-threats/.  
5 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, OPM Data Breach: Personnel Security Background 
Investigation Data, by Michelle D. Christensen, IN10327, July 24, 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IN10327.pdf.  
6 Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In Brief, 2. 
7 “Significant Cyber Incidents,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018, 
https://www.csis.org/programs/cybersecurity-and-governance/technology-policy-program/other-projects-
cybersecurity.  
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cybersecurity was prioritized within the U.S. Office of Personnel Management before these 
incidents, how the breaches were dealt with by OPM leadership and rank-and-file, and whether 
the impacts of an incident as large in scale as the OPM breach were enough impetus to change 
the cybersecurity posture of the Office of Personnel Management in the future. 
Thesis Questions and Scope 
 This thesis examines the events leading up to the OPM data breaches and the handling 
of the repercussions that followed. Specifically, it will evaluate this timeline of events based on 
three guiding questions: 1) What happened in the 2015 U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
Data breach, and what were the impacts? Given the political firestorm that later erupted from 
Congressional oversight authorities, considering an object reconstruction of events is crucial. 
Evaluating both the short-term and long-term impacts of the OPM breaches would ground the 
discussion in a more actionable context for policymakers. 2) Did a lack of technical capability 
hinder OPM’s efforts to detect and block unauthorized access to its network? In understanding 
any cybersecurity incident, it is necessary to consider the technical factors at play. 3) Were 
organizational and management weaknesses more to blame? No matter how strong or weak 
technical capabilities are in an organization, there are many human and management factors 
that affect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets in a network. 
 This thesis will then examine the timeline of events in context. Another important 
question involves the historical consideration of information security within the Office of 
Personnel Management: 4) did the cybersecurity posture at OPM before the incidents change 
after the events in 2014 and 2015? Analyzing OPM’s compliance with relevant federal 
cybersecurity standards before and after the incidents offers a start. Finally, after facing much 
criticism from government oversight groups and public scrutiny over the incidents, 5) what can 
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be done by the Office of Personnel Management to prevent or mitigate the damage from similar 
cyber activities in the future?  
 The scope of this thesis covers the events leading up to, during, and immediately after 
the Office of Personnel Management data breaches. Current events and developments in U.S. 
federal government thinking on cybersecurity are provided when relevant. This thesis also 
analyzes historical Federal Information Security Management/Modernization Act (FISMA) 
compliance data of the Office of Personnel Management from 2007 to 2017 published by the 
OPM Office of the Inspector General. The cybersecurity efforts of other federal agencies are left 
as opportunities for further inquiry; a collective analysis of organization compliance may yield 
additional insights on the state of federal cybersecurity posture as a whole. 
Methodology 
 To answer the questions posed above, this thesis first provides a theoretical foundation 
of the modern cybersecurity “toolkit,” including definitions, categorizations, and institutions 
committed to cybersecurity work. An explanation of the relevant actors involved with 
cybersecurity in the U.S. federal government sets the scene for the OPM breach. Sources relating 
to building this theoretical foundation include recently published books that incorporate 
contemporary cybersecurity theory into relevant case studies and documents that outline the 
structure of how cybersecurity efforts are organized within the U.S. federal government. 
Second, this thesis will reconstruct a timeline of the breach based on a fact base of 
government reports, news articles, and technical analyses. The timeline of events draws from 
the two detailed reports published by the House Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform in 2016: a report entitled “The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized 
Our National Security for More than a Generation” by the Republican majority staff, under 
Chairman Jason Chaffetz of Utah, and responding memo to the Democratic staff on the 
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committee, authored by Ranking Minority Member Elijah E. Cummings of Maryland. 
Contemporaneous news sources, from both mainstream media and more technically-focused 
publications, supplement the timeline of events with additional detail. Furthermore, technical 
analyses, particularly attribution reports, are used in order to answer questions regarding 
OPM’s technical capabilities in defending itself against the incidents. 
Finally, a dataset of Office of Personnel Management FISMA (Federal Information 
Security Modernization Act) annual audit reports from 2007 to 2017, authored by the OPM 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG), was collected and mined to analyze the longer-term 
cybersecurity preparedness of OPM. Three important aspect of these audit reports were 
problem findings, the recommendations offered by the OIG, and the history of each 
recommendation, including whether it was rolled-forward from a previous report (and if so, 
what the history of each roll-forward can tell about the type of policy recommendation made). 
Looking at the data several years before the OPM breaches occurred offers a historical 
perspective of cybersecurity posture at the agency. If data were available regarding the 
implementation status of each recommendation made by the OPM OIG, then such data were 
included in the dataset. If data on recommendation closure was not explicitly available (i.e., a 
specific year’s OIG report redacted certain implementation progress markers) and a 
recommendation was not determined to be open in the following year, the closure date of the 
recommendation was assumed to be the date of the corresponding OIG report’s release. 
Furthermore, the age of all open recommendations is calculated from the initial issuance of the 
recommendation up until March 30, 2018. Typically, the OIG releases semiannual reports to 
Congress on the 30th day of September or March of each year. However, as of May 1, 2018, a 
report on “Open Recommendations as of March 30, 2018” has not been released. The March 30, 
2018 date was selected because it is next the semiannual report milestone after the currently 
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published “Open Recommendations as of September 30, 2017” report to Congress and allows 
for better approximation of the age of recommendations.8 
Comparing and contrasting the FISMA compliance in the years immediately before the 
incidents and the reports post-breaches approximates a measure cybersecurity posture within 
the agency. A wider comparison of security posture and FISMA compliance across federal 
agencies is an area left for further research. While the general approach taken in this thesis may 
be applicable and aggregable for other federal agencies, OPM remains the focus as the added 
scrutiny and government investigative work following the OPM breaches draw attention to the 
agency’s cybersecurity troubles as a unique case. 
  
                                                 
8 David Kennel, “OPM vs. APT: How Proper Implementation of Key Controls Could Have Prevented a Disaster,” 
SANS Institute, March 10, 2016, https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/breaches/opm-vs-apt-proper-
implementation-key-controls-prevented-disaster-36852, 8. 
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Part One: The Cybersecurity Toolkit 
For governments, developments in information technology have yielded tangible 
benefits in domestic policymaking, intelligence gathering, military action, and beyond. Amidst 
major cybersecurity incidents in both the public and private sectors, former President Barack 
Obama called cyberspace the “wild West.”9 The 2015 U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
breach was “one of the largest reported on federal government systems”10 and “shocked the 
U.S. government,”11  but not the only serious cyber intrusion against federal systems in recent 
memory. In the two years prior to the OPM breach, foreign cyber actors were able to penetrate 
the networks of the State Department, Pentagon, and White House.12 Non-state cyber intruders 
have also had success on U.S. government systems, including gaining access to the personal 
email accounts of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of National 
Intelligence in 2015 and 2016.13 This chapter will briefly discuss several background issues to 
better the reader’s understanding of the “cybersecurity toolkit”: (1) different views on and the 
segmentation of cybersecurity, including the defensive lens through which this thesis examines 
the OPM breach; (2) the concept of the “cybersecurity dilemma” in international relations and 
how it pertains to the 2015 OPM incident; and (3) the current landscape of U.S. cybersecurity 
institutions and where the OPM sits within it. 
  
                                                 
9 Bill Chappell, “Obama: Cyberspace Is the New ‘Wild West,’” NPR, February 13, 2015, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/02/13/385960693/obama-to-urge-companies-to-share-data-on-
cyber-threats. 
10 Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In Brief, 1. 
11 Brendan I. Koerner, “Inside the Cyberattack that Shocked the US Government,” Wired, October 23, 2016, 
https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/.  
12 Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust, and Fear Between Nations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 160. 
13 Ibid., 161. 
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1.1. Different Views of Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity is a broad term that encompasses protecting information and 
communications technology (ICT) systems and their contents from cyberattacks, focusing on the 
concepts of information confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Cybersecurity “is also 
sometimes conflated inappropriately in public discussion with other concepts such as privacy, 
information sharing, intelligence gathering, and surveillance.”14 Cybersecurity has important 
implications for these other concepts, however. For example, good cybersecurity may protect 
the privacy of individuals or organizations, such as the personally identifiable information of 
millions of the current and former government employees lost in the OPM breach. Inter-
organization and intra-organization information sharing may bolster the cybersecurity 
capabilities, but that information may include personal details. Cybersecurity may be useful in 
protecting from intelligence gather efforts by an adversary, but the defender might also gather 
intelligence on potential adversaries to bolster its cybersecurity.  
The risks of cyberattack are functions of several factors: threats, vulnerabilities, and 
impacts. Cyber threats are the actors who are carrying out cyberattacks, ranging from criminals, 
spies, nation-state warriors, “hacktivists,” and terrorists. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses or 
oversights in ICT system design or flaws in the implementation of a system.15 Malicious actors 
may target certain vulnerabilities using exploit code to gain unauthorized access to a system, 
and then utilize further malicious code to deploy within the system.16 Cyberattacks “can 
compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of an ICT system and the information 
it handles.”17 In particular, cyberattacks on components of critical infrastructure (CI), including 
                                                 
14 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, by Eric A. 
Fischer, R43831, August 12, 2016, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43831.pdf. 
15 Ibid, 2. 
16 Buchanan, 35. 
17 Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, 2. 
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physical infrastructure, such as water, power, sewage and refineries, as well as economic 
infrastructure, such as stock exchanges, banks, and credit card networks, could have could have 
significant effects on national security, the economy, and the livelihood and safety of individual 
citizens.18 The OPM breach is a case in which nation-state spies or warriors exploited a series of 
vulnerabilities in OPM’s network infrastructure and gained unauthorized access to its systems, 
compromising the confidentiality of millions of data records. As a means of understanding the 
risks and impacts of malicious cyber activities and exploring the OPM breach in more detail, 
cybersecurity can be segmented in several ways. The rest of this section discusses the offensive 
versus defensive elements of cybersecurity, public sector versus private sector efforts in 
cybersecurity, and introduces the analysis of the OPM from the defensive cybersecurity 
perspective. 
1.1.1 Offensive versus Defensive Elements 
Strategically, cyber operations exist along a spectrum: they can be benign or aggressive, 
passive or active.19 Tactically, offensive action taken in cyberspace means breaking into another 
computer network. The process of breaking into a computer network comprises a multi-step 
intrusion model: target acquisition, development, authorization, entry, command and control, 
pivoting, payload activation, and confirmation.20 From a defender’s perspective, a baseline 
network defense model involves preparation, detection, data collection, analysis, containment, 
and decontamination.21 Both offensive and defensive cyber actions are situated within the 
cybersecurity and foreign policy toolkit that nations deploy. Analyzing the 2015 OPM data 
breach from the intruder’s perspective enables a greater understanding of the vulnerabilities 
                                                 
18 Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, 2. 
19 Matteo G. Martemucci, “Offensive Dimensions of Cyber Security: Strategy and Policy Challenges,” U.S. Air Force 
318th Cyberspace Operations Group, August 2014. 
20 Buchanan, 33. 
21 Ibid., 53. 
 10 
exploited by attackers in the OPM network. Examining the incident from a defensive 
perspective provides insight into both the technical ability of OPM to defend against digital 
attacks, and the human dimension of OPM. The defensive angle, then, is particularly useful 
when determining longer-term policy recommendations to prevent or mitigate intruders from 
successfully deploying attacks of this scale.  
1.1.2 Public Sector versus Private Sector Efforts 
 In the public sector, or government model, minimizing cyber risk is a priority that must 
be done at the expense of efficiency. An intelligence agency, for example, must balance between 
(i) fostering informed public debate and motivating the public into action by disclosing 
vulnerabilities, versus (ii), keeping closely-held, actionable information on an adversary outside 
of the public domain to guard an information advantage. In the private sector, the business 
model for managing risk serves an underlying profit motive. Customers’ perception of security 
and stability of a business’ brand may dis-incentivize executives from disclosing cyber risks.22 
Thus, there are fundamentally different approaches between how the public sector and private 
sectors can combat cyber intrusions.23 The U.S. government has the full force of the law behind 
it to respond to cyber incidents, whether through intelligence gathering, containment, or pursue 
even more aggressive cyber action. Under current U.S. law, however, defensive intrusions, or 
“hack back,” by private citizens and corporations are illegal. If allowed, there are risks of online 
vigilantism and greater cyber-instability.  
1.2. The Cybersecurity Dilemma 
In traditional international relations theory, the security dilemma refers to the oftentimes 
counterintuitive notion that, given an anarchic international system, “many of the means by 
                                                 
22 Martemucci. 
23 Ibid. 
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which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”24 Recent theorists 
have broken down the security dilemma into two sequential parts: one is the dilemma of 
interpretation, in which a state attempts to ascertain the intent of another state’s actions, 
commonly under conditions of incomplete information; the other is the dilemma of response, in 
which decision-makers must choose from a spectrum of options that each have consequences of 
varying severity.25 The actions of one nation may inadvertently provoke further brinksmanship 
from the nation being surveilled, and escalate towards real conflict. 
While decision-makers in international relations often grapple with situations of 
incomplete information, the problem of information asymmetry is far more severe in 
cyberspace. Attribution, which involves identifying an actor and identifying that actor’s 
motivations behind orchestrating a cyber incident, is much more difficult. Accurate attribution 
allows the target of a cyber intrusion (such as the United States government) to determine the 
best mechanism for response, ranging from law enforcement measures to diplomatic or military 
tools.26 Meanwhile, determining the intent of a state’s cyber activities is even more complicated, 
as almost all actions may be seen as offensive and existentially threatening to the networks, 
devices, or people of another state. Thus, “there is only a nascent status quo” in cybersecurity.27  
Given that “computer hacking is now part of international relations” and part of the 
“tools of statecraft,”28 situating the 2015 Office of Personnel Management data breach within the 
cybersecurity dilemma allows for better understanding of both the motives behind the hack and 
the reasoning for OPM’s response. Clearly distinguishing between the offensive and defensive 
                                                 
24 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978): 169. 
25 Buchanan, 20. 
26 Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In Brief, 2. 
27 Buchanan, 8. 
28 Ibid., 9. 
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elements of cybersecurity reveals different strategic implications and offers insight into 
policymaking to suit both needs.  
1.2.1 OPM Breach Attribution in the Nascent Status Quo 
 Cyber activity attribution is a multi-faceted process with different implications for 
decision-makers. It “draws on all sources of information available, including technical forensics, 
human intelligence, signals intelligence, history, and geopolitics, among others.”29 In recent 
years, attribution capabilities have strengthened because more nations are attentive to the risks 
of malicious cyber activity and have invested more attention and resources into the issue. 
Improved data collection over the course of a decade has yielded a better “historical corpus,” 
and both the tools and analysts tasked with looking at the data are more seasoned. Dedication 
of attention and resources is a long-term investment as these nations strengthen their attribution 
capabilities.30 On the other hand, as potential cyber adversaries grow more skilled, they are 
more aware that they are being tracked for attribution purposes. They can plant false clues or 
flags, deny activities outright, or discredit circumstantial evidence, to avoid being discovered 
and to discredit attribution overall. Attribution of the OPM breach had important international 
relations ramifications for the United States, particularly with China. Immediately after news of 
the OPM breach broke out, the official U.S. government stance shied away from specific 
attribution of the incident to any actor. But within the same month, former Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper named China as the “leading suspect” behind the OPM attacks and 
“expressed grudging admiration” for the alleged Chinese hackers.31 
  
                                                 
29 Herbert Lin, “Attribution of Malicious Cyber Incidents: From Soup to Nuts,” Hoover Institution Aegis Paper Series, 
no. 1607, September 19, 2016, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/lin_webready.pdf. 
30 Lin, 45. 
31 Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In Brief, 2. 
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1.2.2 The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Taking the Defensive Perspective 
 Given the persistence of cyber adversaries and their efforts against ICT systems in 
general, and not just OPM’s networks, there are clear needs for a network architecture that can 
resist existing and novel attacks, collect actionable intelligence on potential intruders, and 
enable clever defenders to act decisively on that information. A proposed model of baseline 
network defenses includes the six concepts of preparation, detection, data collection, analysis, 
containment, and decontamination. Some scholars, such as Ben Buchanan, argue that multiple, 
asynchronous failures across many different elements and levels within in the OPM’s defensive 
model are what caused the breach to happen. Within the context of the cybersecurity dilemma, 
"states have great incentive to penetrate the networks and operations of other states, even 
before they are themselves targeted."32 
 In the defensive model, preparation involves reducing the attack surface (the reachable 
and exploitable vulnerabilities in a network) by network administrators, on the “defender’s 
turf.”33 Minimizing the attack surface can be achieved by applying regular patches, testing 
updates, and monitoring user accounts. However, software patches are complex in large 
organizations and especially complex for critical infrastructure operators, meaning that at any 
given time, there are likely to be machines running outdated software that contain 
vulnerabilities for intruders to exploit. Defenders often do not have great knowledge of their 
own network; better understanding the topology of and reducing the number of entry and exit 
points to the network enables easier spotting of deviations from a normal, secure baseline. 
 Preparation is especially important for the detection of a cyber intrusion or cyberattack. 
Detection may be external, in which a third-party organization informs the victim of an 
                                                 
32 Buchanan, 64. 
33 Ibid., 54. 
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intrusion of the malicious activity, or internal, in which a victim’s own defensive team may 
uncover evidence of intrusion. Most (approximately 90 percent) cyber intrusions are detected 
externally, and the rest internally.34 Defensive teams may uncover evidence of and detect 
intrusions using pattern-matching or signature-based detection against the code, techniques, 
and infrastructures of known intruders. There are three different indicators of compromise, 
including atomic indicators, computer indicators, and behavioral indicators, that teams may use 
for detection. They can also use pattern-matching tools to compare known indicators of 
malicious cyber activity with activity inside their own networks. Defenders may specifically 
employ “hunters,” analysts who look proactively for weaknesses within the network and 
malicious code that may exploit those weaknesses. Detection is a challenge whose difficulty 
enormously benefits intruders by giving them more time to exploit and attack within the 
network, but improving detection is a “key part of strengthening overall network defense.”35 
 Once an intrusion into an ICT system is detected, further data collection and analysis are 
concurrent processes that provide more information about the exploited vulnerability and the 
attacker. Data collection informs analysis, and vice versa.36 Defenders must work quickly to 
analyze the information on which computers and accounts on their networks intruders have 
compromised, potentially reconstructing events and deconstructing malicious code to better 
understand how it works. At this point, intruders may mislead defenders using specific 
functionalities within their malicious code, making data collection and analysis a time-
consuming step and underscoring the need for proper preparation and ample internal network 
visibility on the part of the defenders in the case of an intrusion. 
                                                 
34 Buchanan, 56. 
35 Ibid., 59. 
36 Ibid., 61. 
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 With enough information on the intruder, it is ultimately up to the decision-maker to 
choose the best method to contain the attack. The defender may directly interfere with the 
operations of intruders, e.g., by identifying the command and control mechanism of the 
intrusion to block it or observe commands; setting up “honeypots” to distract attackers; or 
blocking intruders’ actions after malware deployment to prevent exfiltration. Defenders must 
be aware of techniques used by skilled intruders to make containment difficult, such as 
encryption, unconventional exit routes, and compromised machines.37 
 Once an intrusion or attack is contained, decontamination follows.38 Defenders can 
immediately discard computer hardware entirely to rid the network of a potential recurring 
vector of attack. Or they can use human investigators and automated tools to lead deep and 
intense scans of their network for any remaining signs of malicious code or anomalous activity. 
Besides these immediate actions, defenders must also adapt to a cyber incident and be able to 
stop the next operation. They may be able to deploy more automated tools for detection or 
collect better intelligence from those tools. Organizational changes may also result and require a 
lengthy approval and implementation process but is essential to effecting better cybersecurity. 
The defenders then return to the preparation step, starting the cycle over again. 
1.3 Contextualizing Cybersecurity in the U.S. Federal Government 
 The United States government’s cyber incident response structures encompass a whole-
of-government approach. Federal law across more than 50 statutes task all federal agencies with 
cybersecurity responsibilities for their own systems as well as critical infrastructure-specific 
responsibilities.39 In general, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees the 
                                                 
37 Buchanan, 62. 
38 Ibid., 63 
39 Cyber Intrusion into U.S. Office of Personnel Management: In Brief, 3. 
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implementation of cybersecurity standards developed by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) in federal civilian ICT systems, under the Federal Information Security 
Modernization Act (FISMA), originally the 2002 Federal Information Security Management Act 
and later updated in 2014 by the U.S. Congress.40 
1.3.1. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 
FISMA as it stands today reestablishes the oversight authority of the Director of the 
OMB and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to secure civilian 
government information systems. FISMA directs agency heads “to ensure that: (1) information 
security management processes are integrated with budgetary planning; (2) senior agency 
officials, including chief information officers, carry out their information security 
responsibilities; and (3) all personnel are held accountable for complying with the agency-wide 
information security program.”41 Furthermore, it calls for the use of automated tools in periodic 
agency risk assessments, security testing, and incident detection, reporting, and response. The 
2014 FISMA update also calls for agencies to give timely notification of major information 
security incidents to Congress (within a week) and directs agencies to submit annual reports 
regarding information security preparedness, including “(1) threats and threat actors, 
vulnerabilities, and impacts; (2) risk assessments of affected systems before, and the status of 
compliance of the systems at the time of, major incidents; (3) detection, response, and 
remediation actions; (4) the total number of incidents; and (5) a description of the number of 
individuals affected by, and the information exposed by, major incidents involving a breach of 
personally identifiable information.”42 
                                                 
40 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Public Law 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073-3088, December 18, 2014, 
https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ283/PLAW-113publ283.pdf. 
41 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014. 
42 Ibid. 
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1.3.2. Cybersecurity in the Rest of the U.S. Government 
Military ICT systems fall under the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD).43 
Through the National Security Agency (NSA), the DOD is also responsible for the security of 
national security systems (NSS). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has operational 
responsibility to protect federal civilian systems and private sector critical infrastructure when 
they are under cyber threat.44 DHS also coordinates federal information sharing between 
civilian systems through the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC). The Department of Justice (DOJ) leads federal cyber law-enforcement efforts.45 A 
diagram of various federal agency cybersecurity roles highlighting interagency relationships is 
provided below.46 
                                                 
43 Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, 3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 4. 
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Figure 1. U.S. Federal Government Cybersecurity Relationships and Infrastructure 
Both federal agencies and the legislative branch have increasingly focused on 
cybersecurity in recent years. A significant portion--roughly one in every seven dollars--of 
agency IT budgets constitute funding for cybersecurity, with the FISMA proportion of total IT 
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spending in 2015 at nearly double the amount spent in 2006.47 Legislation proposed in the 111th 
and enacted in the 113th and 114th sessions of Congress have centered on cybercrime laws, data-
breach notification, FISMA reform, information sharing, addressing issues in the “Internet of 
Things,” improving privately-held critical infrastructure, updating research and development, 
and improving the “size, skills, and preparation” of the cybersecurity workforce.48 Despite a 
strong emphasis on cybersecurity efforts within the federal government, that OPM was a victim 
of two major data breaches in 2015 suggests that there is still much more work to be done. 
  
                                                 
47 Cybersecurity Issues and Challenges: In Brief, 3. 
48 Ibid., 5-6. 
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Part Two: The OPM Case Study 
 The basics of the cybersecurity toolkit offered in Part One allows for deeper examination 
of the Office of Personnel Management case study. The defensive perspective is particularly 
useful when it comes to triaging the underlying issues in the OPM data breaches, whether they 
are technical weaknesses, management failures, or a combination of the two. Applying some of 
the concepts from Part One’s toolkit, this chapter (1) offers background about the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management; (2) provides a detailed timeline of events about the OPM data breaches; 
and (3) introduces and examines the relationships between the key actors involved 
2.1. About the U.S. Office of Personnel Management 
2.1.1. The Mission of OPM 
Founded on January 1, 1979, by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,49 the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) replaced the former U.S. Civil Service Commission.50 OPM is a 
federal agency that “serves as the chief human resources agency and personnel policy 
manager” for the U.S. government.51 OPM serves a three-pronged mission: human capital 
management, benefits, and vetting. First, as part of human capital management, OPM designs, 
develops, and promulgates government-wide human resources systems as well as technical 
guidance for human resources management policies and practices. To build a “high quality 
public sector workforce,” OPM works with other government agencies and “provides agencies 
with access to pre-competed private contractors.”52 OPM also provides oversight of best 
practices in the federal civil service. 
                                                 
49 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S. Code 1101, Public Law 95-454, 92 Stat. 1119-1227, October 13, 1978, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1111.pdf.  
50 Ibid., 92 Stat. 1183. 
51 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “About Us,” OPM.gov, https://www.opm.gov/about-us/.  
52 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “What We Do,” OPM.gov, https://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-mission-
role-history/what-we-do/. 
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Second, OPM administers benefits for federal employees and their families, including 
insurance benefits for “more than eight million federal employees, retirees, and their families” 
and the Federal Retirement Program for “more than 2.7 million active employees” and “nearly 
2.6 million annuitants, survivors, and family members.”53 In total, OPM handles the benefits of 
roughly 13 million people annually. A data breach of the systems involved in processing those 
benefits would pose a significant risk to those individuals. 
Third, OPM and its contractors vet prospective employees in the federal hiring process. 
The most important function that OPM serves is performing background checks for security 
clearances for government employees and contractors.54 These background checks include 
standard OPM forms such SF 85 (Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions) and the SF 86 
(Questionnaire for National Security Positions).55 To complete an SF 86 (and be eligible for a 
clearance to handle classified information in a national security position), an applicant must fill 
out personally identifiable information including about relatives, spouses, mental health, 
finances, among many other sensitive topics.56 Implicit in the third prong of OPM’s mission is 
protecting information collected and processed in the vetting process for federal employment. 
2.1.2. OPM Leadership and Organizational Structure 
 The Director of the Office of Personnel Management leads the agency. Since OPM’s 
creation in January 1979, there have been 11 permanent Directors appointed by the President 
and confirmed by the Senate.57 Katherine Archuleta (appointed in May 2013) was the 
                                                 
53 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “What We Do.” 
54 Ibid. 
55 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Standard Forms,” OPM.gov, https://www.opm.gov/forms/standard-
forms/.  
56 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Questionnaire for National Security Positions,” Standard Form 86, OMB 
No. 3206 0005, OPM.gov, Revised December 2010, https://www.opm.gov/forms/pdf_fill/sf86-non508.pdf.  
57 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Our Mission, Role & History,” OPM.gov, https://www.opm.gov/about-
us/our-mission-role-history/agency-leadership/.  
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permanent Director presiding over OPM during the data breaches and resigned on July 10, 
2015. After Archuleta’s resignation two Acting Directors led the agency before a permanent 
replacement could be found. The first, Beth Cobert, was in office from July 10, 2015 to January 
19, 2017.58 The second, Kathleen McGettigan, served from January 19, 2017 to March 9, 2018.59 
On March 9, 2018, Jeff T. H. Pon was confirmed as the 11th permanent Director of the Office of 
Personnel Management, after nearly three years without a permanent director.60 
 The Office of the Director manages five different vertical functions within OPM: 1) 
various Program Divisions; 2) the Office of the General Counsel; 3) Office of Communications; 
4) Congressional, Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs; and 5) various Support 
Functions.61 First, OPM program divisions focus on federal government human resources 
management, including employee services, retirement services, healthcare and insurance, merit 
system accountability and compliance, suitability executive agent, the National Background 
Investigations Bureau, and other human resources solutions. Second, the Office of the General 
Counsel offers legal advice and representation for OPM leadership and also plays an 
enforcement and arbitration role related to federal government employee practices. Third, the 
Office of Communications informs the broader public about OPM’s work. Fourth, 
Congressional, Legislative, and Intergovernmental Affairs is the chief conduit between OPM 
and the U.S. Congress, with Congressional relations, legislative analysis, constituent services, 
and intergovernmental affairs functions. Fifth, OPM’s support function offices include the Chief 
                                                 
58 Eric Katz, “With No Confirmed Director, OPM Could Struggle to Implement Trump’s Agenda,” Government 
Executive, August 17, 2017, https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/08/no-confirmed-director-opm-could-
struggle-implement-trumps-agenda/140332/. 
59 See section on Kathleen McGettigan in U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Our People & Organization: Senior 
Staff Bios,” OPM.gov, https://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-people-organization/senior-staff-bios/. 
60 Ibid. See section on Jeff T. H. Pon.  
61 See the sidebar of the following URL: https://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-people-organization/office-of-the-
director/.  
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Financial Officer, the Chief Information Officer, Planning and Policy Analysis, Diversity and 
Inclusion, Equal Employment Opportunity, Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management, 
and the Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory Committee. Independent of the Director’s office is the 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which is an internal watchdog group that conducts audits 
of key OPM programs and provides recommendations to improve OPM’s performance.62 Under 
OIG are the Office of Legal and Legislative Affairs, the Office of Audits, the Office of 
Investigations, the Office of Evaluations and Inspections, and the Office of Management. An 
organizational chart summarizing the OPM’s leadership structure is provided in Appendix I. 
2.1.3. Information Technology Systems Architecture at OPM 
 Publicly available specifications of OPM’s information technology systems architecture 
are largely contained within the OPM’s Inspector General (OIG) annual FISMA audits. As of 
2017, OPM’s system inventory indicated that the agency’s information technology network 
consisted of 46 major systems. 63 According to OPM’s 2016 FISMA audit, 16 (over one-third) of 
those systems were operated by a contractor, with 82 interconnections those systems with 
agency-operated systems. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires 
all federal agencies to monitor and test security controls, develop and test contingency plans, 
use the plan of action and milestones process, among other requirements. For instance, in 2015, 
the year of the major OPM breach, the OIG found that a total of 30 systems were subject to 
annual security control testing (20 of 29 systems operated by OPM, and 10 of 17 systems 
operated by a contractor).64 Although OPM’s performance in 2015 was lackluster, it worsened 
                                                 
62 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Our Inspector General,” OPM.gov, https://www.opm.gov/about-us/our-
inspector-general/. 
63 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Audits, “Federal Information 
Security Modernization Act Audit Fiscal Year 2017,” 4A-CI-00-17-020, October 27, 2017, 46. 
64 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Office of the Inspector General, Office of Audits, “Federal Information 
Security Modernization Act Audit FY 2015,” 4A-CI-00-15-011, November 10, 2015, 13. 
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significantly in 2017: only 9 of OPM’s 46 systems were subject to adequate security controls 
testing and monitoring.65 
2.2. Timeline of Events 
The OPM breach occurred over a 12-month period and actually consisted of two distinct 
incidents in which OPM’s networks were compromised: the first was reported in March 2014, 
and the second identified in April 2015. The timeline for these two attackers becomes muddled 
at times, as the House Oversight and Government Report Committee writes in its 2016 report 
that “sloppy cyber hygiene and inadequate security technologies… left OPM with reduced 
visibility into the traffic on its systems.”66 Furthermore, there was significant partisan 
disagreement in Congress over certain details of the breach timeline. The following timeline of 
events attempts to integrate the investigative findings from the House Committee report, 
drafted by Republican staff members under then-Chairman Jason Chaffetz (former Republican 
Representative from Utah), and a memorandum sent Elijah J. Cummings (Democratic 
Representative from Maryland) sent to Democratic members on the committee in response to 
the report. These timeline events are then corroborated by reporting in the media to paint a 
clearer picture of the events leading up to the malicious cyber activities in OPM’s systems in 
2014 and 2015 as well as the events that followed. 
The “OPM hack” is in fact a series of multi-stage incidents that resulted in a combined 
loss of several million data records. The first breach of OPM systems was done by an adversary 
that managed to exfiltrated sensitive OPM IT architecture information. This first breach, 
                                                 
65 “Federal Information Security Modernization Act Audit Fiscal Year 2017,” 40. 
66 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, The OPM Data Breach: How the 
Government Jeopardized Our National Security for More than a Generation, 114th Cong., September 7, 2016,  
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/The-OPM-Data-Breach-How-the-Government-
Jeopardized-Our-National-Security-for-More-than-a-Generation.pdf, viii. 
 25 
detected in early 2014, did not result in the theft of personally identifiable information (PII).67 
The second breach involved three stages, or incidents; as the adversary moved laterally within 
OPM’s network, OPM personnel records, background investigation data, and fingerprint data 
were exfiltrated across three distinct time periods. Each incident was reported to Congress and 
the public at large separately. In the end, the data of 4.2 million current and former federal 
employees, 21.5 million individuals applying for background check investigations with OPM, 
and 5.6 million fingerprints were stolen. 
2.2.1. Burgeoning Intrusions 
These breaches were years in the making. Adversaries had access to OPM’s network as 
early as July 2012,68 as US-CERT (the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Response 
Team) reported that an OPM server hosted HiKit69 malware since 2012, meaning that there 
were already deficiencies in OPM’s networks. The first attacker (reported in March 2014 and 
dubbed “Hacker X1” in the report) gained access to OPM systems in November 2013. In this 
first known malicious activity, Hacker X1 made off with OPM IT assets, but did not steal any 
personally identifiable information.70 The second attacker (identified in April 2015, called 
“Hacker X2” by the committee) first became active within OPM’s networks in December 2013, 
targeting information hosted by OPM and harvesting credentials from OPM contractors. The 
                                                 
67 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Memorandum: Committee Investigation into 
the OPM Data Breach, 114th Cong., September 6, 2016, https://democrats-
oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2016-09-
06.Democratic%20Memo%20on%20OPM%20Data%20Breach%20Investigation.pdf, 2. 
68 Most timeline items are drawn from a comparison between House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
report and the Ranking Member’s memo published the day before. See The OPM Data Breach: How the Government 
Jeopardized Our National Security for More than a Generation, 5-13, and Memorandum: Committee Investigation into the 
OPM Data Breach.  
69 The HiKit malware is a rootkit, which provides unauthorized remote access to a computer system or a network 
interface. More specific details are available at the following link: http://www.novetta.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/HiKit.pdf.  
70 Aliya Sternstein and Jack Moore, “Timeline: What We Know About the OPM Breach (UPDATED),” Nextgov, June 
26, 2015, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/06/timeline-what-we-know-about-opm-breach/115603/.  
 26 
same month, hackers breached USIS and KeyPoint Government Solutions, two contractors 
involved in conducting background check investigations of national security workers.71 
2.2.2. Command and Control 
Once OPM was breached in late 2013 by Hacker X1, the bulk of lateral activity by the 
attackers within OPM’s systems occurred in 2014. OPM also took several counterintelligence 
measures in response. On March 20, 2014, US-CERT notified OPM of Hacker X1’s exfiltration of 
manuals and IT system architecture information, among other unknown lost data. OPM then 
implemented a strategy to monitor and gather counterintelligence on the attackers. Five days 
later, on March 25, OPM CIO Donna Seymour was given a situation report. One week after the 
initial US-CERT notification, on March 27, OPM also developed what would be known as the 
“Big Bang,” a “plan for full shut down [of systems] if needed” and eventually used as a 
defensive measure. 
April 2014 saw the continuation of operations by both the attackers and OPM in 
response. OPM continued defensive preparations; on April 11, Donna Seymour was briefed on 
“tactical mitigation strategies and [a] security remediation plan.” On April 21, SRA,72 an OPM 
contractor, discovered additional, “specific” malware and notified US-CERT.  Several days later, 
on April 25, the attackers began moving forward with deploying their command and control 
infrastructure, registering the domain name “opmsecurity.org” to a certain “Steve Rogers” (an 
alias for “Captain America” in the Marvel movie franchise). This domain would later be used 
for exfiltration of the data stolen from OPM.  
  
                                                 
71 Sternstein and Moore. The USIS intrusion may have occurred as early as April 2013. 
72 SRA was a federal contractor retained by OPM, recently acquired by General Dynamics. For more information, see 
https://www.csra.com/.  
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2.2.3. OPM Contractors Breached 
By May 2014, the situation grew more complicated, as several OPM contractors who 
were victim to previous cyberattacks were now losing PII. KeyPoint Government Solutions73 
was breached in a 2014 cyberattack, which resulted in the theft of the PII of roughly 48,000 
employees. On May 7, 2014, Hacker X2 “established a foothold into OPM’s network” by posing 
as a KeyPoint employee tasked with performing background checks. Hacker X2 used an OPM 
credential to remotely access the OPM network and installs PlugX74 malware to gain backdoor 
access. Despite OPM deploying counterintelligence measures against Hacker X1, identified by 
US-CERT back in March 2014, OPM’s systems did not successfully detect this intrusion by 
Hacker X2. Nevertheless, OPM made progress later in the month against Hacker X1. On May 
27, OPM noticed that Hacker X1 had loaded keylogging software75 onto several OPM database 
administrator workstations and were within earshot to the system holding background 
investigation data. OPM carried out its “Big Bang” plan to remove Hacker X1 that day by 
shutting down the compromised those workstations. Furthermore, the Department of 
Homeland Security “remained with their Mandiant [malware detection and removal] tool for 
another 30 or 45 days.”76 However, the “Big Bang” event did not flush out Hacker X2, who 
retained access to the OPM network.  
On June 5, malware was successfully installed on a KeyPoint web server. On June 10, 
OPM CIO Donna Seymour testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
                                                 
73 KeyPoint Government Solutions was a contractor retained by OPM’s Federal Investigative Services to perform 
background investigations to determine suitability for security clearances. 
74 PlugX is another variant of remote access Trojan (RAT) malware. For more information, see here: 
https://www.lastline.com/labsblog/an-analysis-of-plugx-malware/.  
75 A keylogger may be legal or illegal but used for the express purpose of recording keystrokes and transmitting them 
back to a central system or server. In OPM’s case, the keyloggers installed were clearly used maliciously and illegally 
for the purposes of cyber theft or cyber espionage. 
76 The OPM Data Breach: How the Government Jeopardized Our National Security for More than a Generation, 61. 
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Affairs’ Subcommittee on OPM’s Strategic Information Technology Plan, released in 2014. In her 
testimony she does not disclose the March 2014 breach. Additionally, despite being given a 
clean bill of cyber health by OPM IT security personnel in May 2014, USIS notified OPM in early 
June about the December 2013 breach.77 On June 12, OPM and Cylance, an antivirus software 
firm, reached an agreement that would allow OPM to test two Cylance products--Cylance V 
and Cylance Protect. Just over a week later, on June 20, Hacker X2 initiated what would be a 
nearly year-long remote desktop protocol (RDP) session with servers supporting background 
investigation processes. On June 22, DHS issued a non-public, final incident report for OPM 
“manuals” breach discovered on March 20, 2014, reporting that “No new systems [were] 
communicating with known C2 [command and control] servers; no new attacker activity 
observed.”78 The following day, US-CERT and OPM designate this breach as the “First known 
adversarial access to OPM’s mainframe.”  
2.2.4. OPM Manuals Breach Draws Public Attention 
Over the course of the next two months, in July and August 2014, OPM saw increasing 
scrutiny from the media, while Hacker X2 exfiltrated background investigation data from OPM. 
On July 9, OPM acknowledged publicly for the first time that there was a breach of its systems 
by Chinese hackers back in March 2014, as reported by the New York Times.79 OPM maintained 
that no PII was lost in the breach but “did not disclose the exfiltration of the manuals.” Roughly 
three weeks later, on July 29, the attackers continued the domain name registration process by 
registering “opmlearning.org” to “Tony Stark” (the pseudonym of the “Iron Man” character in 
the Marvel franchise) as another means of command and control. On August 16, the malware 
                                                 
77 Sternstein and Moore.  
78 Memorandum: Committee Investigation into the OPM Data Breach, 6.  
79 Michael S. Schmidt, David E. Sanger, and Nicole Perlroth, “Chinese Hackers Pursue Key Data on U.S. Workers,” 
The New York Times, July 9, 2014. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/world/asia/chinese-hackers-pursue-key-
data-on-us-workers.html.  
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on KeyPoint systems stopped operation. In summary, during these summer months, Hacker X2 
successfully stole tens of millions of sensitive background check records from OPM. Also, in 
August, USIS, an OPM contractor that conducts background checks as part of hiring 
investigations, was found to have been breached by attackers, thus compromising the personal 
information of thousands of federal employees.80  
2.2.5. Attackers “Tap the Mother Lode”81 
Activities slowed in their pace but not their intensity over the last several months of 
2014. In October, the FBI Cyber Division issued a Cyber Flash Alert warning against Chinese 
government-affiliated cyber actors committing espionage on U.S. commercial and government 
networks.82 Hacker X2 remained in the OPM environment and moved to the U.S. Department of 
Interior (DOI) data center storing OPM personnel records. In November, private-industry 
cybersecurity companies warned about threats posed to “human resources components of [the] 
federal government” and releases a report on the Axiom Threat Actor and the Advanced 
Persistent Threat (APT) group’s activities. In December, hacker X2 exfiltrated 4.2 million U.S. 
federal government employee personnel records from the DOI database holding OPM’s 
personnel records. On December 18, OPM alerted more than 48,000 federal contractors about 
the exposure of personal information from the KeyPoint breach.83 Activity quieted the first two 
months of 2015 and resumed in March 2015. On March 3, attackers registered the domain “wdc-
news-post.com”, a domain used for command and control and data exfiltration. Nearly a week 
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later, on March 9, traffic to “opmsecurity.org,” the domain registered in April 2014 to “Steve 
Rogers.” Investigators found that on March 26, fingerprint data was exfiltrated. 
2.2.6. Discovery 
OPM conducted significant data collection and analysis of the intruders in its systems in 
April 2015. On April 15, upon being alerted by SRA, OPM notified US-CERT about suspicious 
network traffic from OPM’s servers to “opmsecurity.org.” This sequence of events corroborates 
Ranking Member Cummings’ memo detailing that “OPM discovered the breach on April 15 or 
16, 2015,” not a third-party entity.84 
The next day, April 16, two significant events occurred. First, Brendan Saulsbury, an 
OPM contract engineer who detected an unknown SSL (Secure Socket Layer) certificate as part 
of his contract work within the agency’s Security Operations Center, reportedly detected 
malicious activity from malware disguised as an antivirus software file “beaconing out to a 
command and control server from, at the time, two different servers.”85 Second, OPM first 
contacted Cylance regarding the Cylance V product it had purchased on September 4, 2014. 
While the House Committee report notes that Cylance V “is not intended to be an enterprise-
wide prevention tool,”86 it nonetheless was crucial in detecting network anomalies and the 
existence of malware on OPM’s systems. 
The following day, April 17, OPM deployed CylanceProtect, an enterprise-wide 
protection tool, on its systems and called in Cylance onsite for incident response. Over the 
course of the next two days, April 18 to April 19, CylanceProtect is deployed to over 2,000 
devices and found malicious activities within OPM systems. CyTech Services, a network 
forensics provider, was hired by OPM on April 21 to provide a demonstration of its CyTech 
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Forensics and Incident Response (CyFIR) tool the following day. CyTech would stay onsite until 
May 1. The distinction between Cylance and CyTech must be made here: despite CyTech’s 
claims that it had first discovered malware on OPM’s systems (and therefore the breach), 
OPM’s Director of Security Operations, Jeff Wagner, spoke on the record about contacting then-
OPM CIO Donna Seymour on April 17, 2015--five days before CyTech’s product demonstration-
--about the Cylance product assisting with forensics and finding malware on OPM’s network.87 
On April 22, Donna Seymour testified before the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee about the “manuals” breach from March 2014. That same day, the OPM 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) learns about the breach for the first time. The next day, 
April 23, OPM determined that the exfiltration of personnel records constituted a “major 
incident,” triggering a requirement to notify Congress. On the system protection from, OPM 
ordered a global quarantine of the malware found by CylanceProtect. On April 26, Cylance 
identified the June 2014 RDP session established by Hacker X2 back in June 2014. On April 30, a 
week after triggering the Congressional notification requirement, OPM notified Congress. 
In May and June 2015, OPM continued to notify Congress of the different stages of the 
data breach and received considerable attention in the press. On May 8, US-CERT established 
“with a high degree of certainty that personnel records data/PII had been stolen.” On May 20, 
OPM determined that the exfiltration of background investigation data also constituted another 
“major incident,” triggering another requirement to notify congress; OPM notified Congress a 
week later, on May 27. At this time, OPM also notified the OIG about potential background 
investigation information compromise. On June 4, 2015, OPM briefed the media and issued a 
press statement on the loss of 4.2 million former and current federal employee personnel 
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records. On June 8, a month after US-CERT evaluated the loss of personnel data records, it 
again established “with a high degree of certainty that background investigation data/PII [had] 
been exfiltrated and stolen.” By this time, the breach had reached the highest ranks of 
leadership at OPM. On June 16, 2015, OPM Director Katherine Archuleta publicly 
acknowledged that background investigation data may have been compromised in a separate 
breach. OPM also estimated that 1.1 million fingerprint records had been lost that same 
summer. Archuleta blamed OPM’s lax security practices and procedures, including a lack of 
basic encryption, on antiquated systems.  
2.2.7. Immediate Fallout 
On June 23, Director Archuleta testified at a Congressional hearing that hackers used 
comprised KeyPoint user credentials to access OPM’s network.88 On June 24, 2015, Donna 
Seymour again testified before the House Committee to minimize the impact of the 2014 
“manuals” breach. Late that month, on June 29, the American Federation of Government 
Employees (AFGE) filed a class action lawsuit against OPM for the data breaches (although 
these suits were dismissed in September 2017). Mitigation and other defensive procedures 
continued all the same, with CylanceProtect detecting and blocking nearly 2,000 pieces of 
malware across over 10,250 devices. The same month, OPM released a document titled, 
“Actions to Strengthen Cybersecurity and Protect Critical IT Systems” to discuss actions taken 
by OPM about security breaches, actions to mitigate security breaches currently underway, and 
future proposed actions in response to the incident. OPM provided a list of 23 action items that 
the agency took under then-Director Archuleta’s leadership, and a list of 15 new actions to 
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“bolster and modernize IT systems.”89 However, the plan may have proved too little, too late, as 
fallout from the incident continued into the summer and the backlash grew more tumultuous.  
In a House Oversight Committee hearing about the OPM data breach on June 24, 2015, 
Chairman Chaffetz and 17 other Republican members of the committee requested the removal 
of then-OPM CIO Donna Seymore and then-OPM Director Katherine Archuleta.90 On July 9, 
OPM confirmed 21.5 million background investigation records were compromised. The next 
day, July 10, Katherine Archuleta resigned as OPM director. The same day, Beth Cobert was 
appointed as Acting Director of OPM, thus beginning a nearly three-year period during which 
OPM was without the leadership of a permanent Director. Shortly after the breaches, OPM 
awarded a $20 million-plus contract for identity protection from Austin, Texas-based firm CSID. 
Upon acknowledging that the OPM breach included more than 5.6 million sets of fingerprints in 
September 2015 (five times the original 1.1 million amount),91 OPM awarded a $133 million 
contract to the Portland, Oregon-based private firm ID Experts to provide similar identity 
protection services, although security experts have doubted the extent to which such services 
would adequately protect the future privacy of the affected data breach victims.92  
2.2.8. Later Developments and OPM Today 
On July 21, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee began its 
investigation of the OPM incidents, requesting documents from the agency. On August 20, 
OPM returned the CyFIR tool to CyTech. On September 23, 2015, OPM updated its estimate of 
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fingerprint records lost to 5.6 million, from an original estimate of 1.1 million. On February 22, 
2016, OPM CIO Donna Seymour resigned. On September 6, the Ranking Member of the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Elijah Cummings of Maryland, released a 
memo sent to Democratic members of the Committee in anticipation of the release of the 
Majority Staff report, under the leadership of Chairman Jason Chaffetz of Utah, on the OPM 
data breaches. The next day, the Republic leadership in the Committee released the report. 
When the Trump administration began on January 20, 2017, Acting Directorship of the 
agency transitioned from Beth Cobert to Kathleen McGettigan, an OPM veteran. Slightly over a 
year later, on March 8, 2018, the Senate voted to confirm the nomination of Jeff T. H. Pon as 
permanent OPM director after a lengthy confirmation process that included a brief political 
struggle between the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and 
OPM over document requests and the separate, failed nomination of an OPM veteran as a 
candidate who withdrew from federal employee backlash and background check concerns.93 
On March 12, 2018, Jeff Pon began his appointment as the 11th Director of the U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management, starting alongside the new Deputy Director, Michael Rigas.94  
In September 2017, U.S. District Judge Amy Jackson of the U.S. District Court for D.C. 
dismissed two separate lawsuits filed by the National Treasury Employees Union and the 
American Federation of Government Employees, citing the lack of the plaintiffs’ standing95 and 
the “difficulty of legally proving harm as the result of having personally identifiable 
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information (PII) stolen.”96 Today, OPM still offers online resources for individuals who were 
impacted by both the background check and personnel records cyber incidents. Four services 
are provided: identity monitoring, credit monitoring, identity restoration services, and identity 
theft insurance.97 
2.3 Notable Actors 
Better understanding both the defensive and offensive actors during the OPM data 
breach incidents allows builds crucial context in analyzing the capabilities and preparedness of 
either side as they relate to each other. Three major sets of players (two from the defensive 
perspective, and one from the offensive perspective) are relevant to the discussion of the OPM 
case study: 1) the U.S. federal government, including OPM and other relevant agencies 
responsible for detecting and responding to the breaches; 2) federal contractors, whose 
relationships with the U.S. federal government was targeted and exploited to break into OPM; 
and 3) Chinese-government backed Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), which many security 
analysts would attribute to be behind the OPM breach. 
2.3.1. Defensive: U.S. Federal Government Agencies 
 Most of the actors within the U.S. federal government during this time were members of 
OPM leadership. In addition, OPM partnered with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to investigate and mitigate the data 
breaches. Additionally, OPM received law enforcement assistance from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) in the search for the authors of the command and control malware installed 
onto their servers. Two primary offices within OPM set the policy direction for information 
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security and cybersecurity preparedness. The Office of the Chief Information Officer reports 
directly to the Office of the Director. The OPM Director presiding over the data breaches was 
Katherine Archuleta, who was appointed by President Obama on May 23, 2013, sworn in on 
November 4, 2013,98 and ultimately resigned on July 10, 2015 from bipartisan fallout over the 
OPM breaches. Critics argued that Archuleta lacked a particular expertise in cybersecurity for 
decision-making during the breach.99 
Upon Archuleta’s resignation, Beth Cobert took over as Acting Director of OPM in July 
2015. Reporting directly to both Archuleta and Cobert was the OPM Chief Information Officer, 
Donna K. Seymour, who served in the role from December 2013 until February 2016. During her 
tenure as CIO, Seymour “turned an ‘array of aging systems’ into a more ‘modern, secure 
environment… to better protect [OPM’s] existing legacy systems.’”100 Despite mounting 
pressure for her firing in the months leading up to her resignation, Seymour was a federal 
service veteran who led an aggressive effort to find the intruders in OPM’s network.101 
US-CERT was created in September 2003 to “protect the Nation’s Internet infrastructure 
by coordinating defense against and response to cyberattacks.”102 US-CERT works with federal 
agencies, the private sector, the research community, state and local governments, and 
international entities to provide detection, data collection, analysis, containment, and 
decontamination measures in response to cyber incidents. During the OPM breaches, the 
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agency not only reported information about the breaches to US-CERT, but also worked with 
US-CERT to develop the “Big Bang” counterintelligence plan in March 2014 and detect and 
remove the intruders stealing OPM data in the early months of 2015. In 2017, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security streamlined the organizational structure National 
Cybersecurity and Communications, integrating US-CERT into a single, broader National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) structure, which seeks to 
“reduce the risk of systemic cybersecurity and communications challenges in [its] role as the 
Nation’s flagship cyber defense, incident response, and operational integration center.” 
Law enforcement agencies also play a role in cyber incident response. On June 4, 2015, 
OPM announced that it was partnering with the FBI in addition to DHS to investigate the 
impact of the incident on federal personnel; the FBI confirmed its cooperation with OPM the 
same day.103 The next day, the FBI issued a Flash Alert detailing the technical workings of 
Sakula, a form of malware known as a remote access trojan (RATs) that was used by malicious 
groups to compromise and steal PII.104 This revelation was done much to the delight of the 
cybersecurity research community, which speculated that those were the same RATs used in 
the OPM data breaches.105, 106 The FBI’s cooperation yielded promising results in due time. In 
August, 2017, the FBI arrested a Chinese national related to the creation of the Sakula 
malware.107 
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2.3.2. Defensive: Affected Federal Contractors in Background Investigations and Healthcare 
 Several OPM contractors that provided investigative background check and healthcare 
services for OPM were targeted around the time of the OPM breaches. These contractors 
include: U.S. Investigations Services, LLC (USIS); KeyPoint Government Solutions; Anthem; 
and Premera. According to the House Oversight committee report, USIS was the largest 
background investigation contractor and detected a June 2014 cybersecurity breach carried out 
by a state-sponsored actor (an Advanced Persistent Threat, or APT) that affected the PII of over 
31,000 background check investigations for the Department of Homeland Security. USIS had 
mitigated the breach in July 2014 and publicly acknowledged the breach in August 2014. As it 
appeared that the APT was going after background investigation data, the U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) approached KeyPoint to assess the security of the 
contractor. In December 2014, KeyPoint had also been breached, affecting the PII of over 48,000 
federal employees. In June 2015, the CEO of KeyPoint confirmed that the user credentials of an 
employee at the company were compromised in order to gain access to OPM.108 
 Anthem and Premera were two healthcare-related OPM contractors that were breached 
during the course of events in the OPM incident. In February 2015, Anthem, which provides 
healthcare coverage for 1.3 million federal employees, announced a data breach of 80 million 
healthcare records of current and former customers and employees. The next month, in March 
2015, Premera, with an OPM contract covering 130,000 federal employees, announced a data 
breach exposing medical data and financial information of 11 million customers. Therefore, as 
part of a multi-stage intrusion, a total of tens of millions of contractor records related to 
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background check investigations and healthcare information were harvested by adversaries in 
order to gain access into OPM and exfiltrate data. 
2.3.3. Offensive: Chinese-Government Backed Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) 
After a network or computer system intrusion has occurred and is detected, attribution 
is important for both intelligence gathering purposes and reassurance to the public. For many 
nation-state governments, attribution is a tricky balancing act. On one side, in the face of a 
major data breach or a cyber incident, there is a prerogative to be transparent as possible about 
the details of such an incident to reassure the public. In a cyber status quo with few norms and 
written rules of engagement, attribution also plays a critical role in “naming and shaming” as 
part of a nation’s foreign policy toolkit. On the other hand, revealing too much information can 
be a double-edged sword, as many technical details used to justify an attribution to another 
actor may also reveal the sources and methods used by the defending nation-state to detect and 
respond to cyber incidents. 
Against this complicated and nuanced technical, diplomatic, and intelligence backdrop, 
the U.S. government was initially mum about publicly attributing the OPM breach to any 
specific nation-state actor. In late July, 2015, U.S. officials were reluctant to publicly blame China 
for the OPM intrusion “out of reluctance to reveal the evidence that American investigators 
have assembled”109 ahead of a state visit by Chinese President Xi Jinping to the United States. In 
December 2015, the Chinese government claimed that it had arrested the hackers responsible 
for the OPM breaches earlier in the year, characterizing the activity as a criminal matter rather 
than state-sponsored action.110 Nevertheless, leadership in the intelligence community, such as 
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former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, noted that the OPM breach was an 
example of sophisticated intelligence work outside the scope of normal industrial espionage.111 
The OPM data breaches were eventually linked to a Chinese-government backed 
advanced persistent threat (APT) by both indirect government attribution and publicly 
available intelligence analyzed by the cybersecurity research community. APTs are “well-
financed, often state-sponsored team[s] of hackers.”112 APTs such as the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army Unit #61398 are extensions of the Chinese military and have been documented 
as having conducted cyber espionage since at least 2006.113 Although Unit #61398 may not have 
been the precise actor that targeted the OPM data, the kinds of activities it conducts and the 
support it receives from the Chinese government are indicative of the potential havoc an APT 
can wreak upon its targets. 
Outside of government, security researchers found strong ties to Chinese-based actors 
from the command and control infrastructure detected in the breach, linking the malicious 
activity to not only OPM but the Anthem, Premera, and other healthcare-based organization 
breaches. Additionally, the researchers were able to tie the Sakula-based RAT malware to the 
registration of domain names used for the malicious command and control infrastructure used 
in the exfiltration of data. In September 2017, the FBI arrested the author of the malware Yu 
Pingan, also known as “GoldSun,” furthering the China-OPM breach link.  
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2.3.4. Relationship between Actors 
 The relationship between the actors in the OPM breaches may be contextualized by the 
framework offered in Buchanan’s cybersecurity dilemma. From the defenders’ (U.S. 
government and federal contractors) perspective, a baseline network defense model involves 
preparation, detection, data collection, analysis, containment, and decontamination. While OPM 
and its federal contractors were arguably ill-prepared for such a sophisticated, multi-stage 
intrusion from a foreign intruder, detection was the most difficult step, as it took OPM several 
months in the timeline of events before it noticed that there was suspicious cyber activity within 
its network. Once OPM had ascertained that a stolen contractor credential had been used for the 
unauthorized access of data, its later investigative efforts alongside US-CERT and the FBI 
greatly accelerated the data collection, analysis, containment, and decontamination steps. 
 From the offensive perspective (Chinese government-backed APTs), the multi-step 
intrusion model--target acquisition, development, authorization, entry, command and control, 
pivoting, payload activation, and confirmation--may be applied in better understanding some 
of the details of the OPM breach. It seems clear now that target acquisition was primarily the 
sensitive PII of U.S. federal government employees and contractors, most likely for 
counterintelligence purposes. The development and authorization stages are hazy as they are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, from information gleaned about the OPM breaches, 
the intruders’ method of entry was clear (stealing contractor credentials before entering OPM’s 
systems); their command and control infrastructure has been revealed (the Sakula malware 
used to communicate); and their pivoting, payload activation, and confirmation details 
contained in publicly available government reports. The OPM data breaches are an example of 
the majority of offensive actions taken first, before defensive measures could be used to stem 
the impact of the incidents.   
 42 
Part Three: Diagnostics of the OPM Failure 
 With a timeline of the OPM breaches and a wider fact base established, this chapter (1) 
discusses the technical elements behind the OPM data breaches; (2) examines the policy, 
personnel, and management elements leading to the OPM data breaches; (3) analyzes OPM’s 
FISMA compliance audit data from 2007 to 2017 to provide insight on the agency’s historical 
cybersecurity preparedness and posture; and (4) evaluates the various technical, management, 
and compliance factors in OPM’s failure to secure its information assets. 
3.1. Overview of Technical Elements behind the OPM Data Breaches 
 Over the course of many months, adversaries exploited a combination of vulnerabilities 
to conduct a sophisticated, multi-stage cyber espionage operation114 on the U.S. Office of 
Personnel management. The first step of the espionage operation involved systematically 
penetrating the networks of various OPM investigations and healthcare contractors in an effort 
to obtain login credentials.115 Next, the intruders moved laterally within the OPM network and 
deployed a malware payload for command and control operations. Then, data from OPM were 
systematically exfiltrated via the command and control infrastructure. While OPM worked to 
flush out one set of attackers from a previous cyber incident that did not result in the loss of PII, 
the agency did not detect a second intruder’s presence, which would later result in the loss of 
millions of records. An OPM security contractor detected network traffic anomalies and strange 
files indicative of a malware attack, triggering a larger response to the second attacker’s 
presence that would eventually break the news of the breach. 
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3.1.1. The Axiom Group and HiKit Malware in the “Manuals” Breach 
In the investigation of the OPM “manuals” breach, US-CERT had found Hikit malware 
on several OPM systems as early as 2012;116 the House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee concluded that the OPM data breach discovered in March 2014 originated from the 
Axiom Group,117 a state-sponsored threat actor, based on the presence of the Hikit malware and 
other tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with the group that have been publicly 
reported in the past.118 
Two variants of the Hikit malware, known as Hikit A and Hikit B, were used in the 
OPM “manuals” breach discovered in March 2014; there is no indication that OPM understood 
how the attackers initially gained entry into OPM’s system.119 Hikit installs itself as a network 
adapter between the physical network interface and network protocol drivers, so that it can 
monitor incoming traffic, intercept command and control data from outside infrastructure, and 
then parse the commands.120 Such operations allow the malware to “phone home” for 
commands as well as transmit stolen information assets. While no personally identifiable 
information was taken during this breach, the intruders did have access to the OPM server 
containing background investigation materials. The information taken about OPM’s systems 
that may have given future adversaries details about the architecture of OPM’s environment 
that would later be useful in stealing sensitive personnel data and other PII. 
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3.1.2. Contractor Access and Permissions in the Second Data Breach 
 The federal government works with many contractors to conduct certain functions 
within the bureaucracy. OPM in particular contracted work with third-party background check 
investigation providers and healthcare providers as part of its human resources and vetting 
mission. Specifically, in a December, 2014 breach, KeyPoint Government Solutions, an OPM 
investigations contractor had been breached, resulting in the loss of PII for over 48,000 of its 
employees and the theft of legitimate login credentials that would enable a user to gain access to 
OPM’s systems. According to the House report on the OPM breach, the exact process by which 
OPM attackers were able to steal a valid credential from KeyPoint remains unclear. 
Nevertheless, attackers then exploited this legitimate login credential as a vector of infection to 
then tunnel into the OPM network via a virtual private network (VPN) and install a malware 
payload, providing command and control access from afar.121 
 Using the stolen credentials from KeyPoint and the VPN session, attackers first gained 
access to an SQL database server and opened a remote desktop connection (RDP) to deploy the 
malware payload. Information security at OPM explained that the SQL server served as a 
firewalled “back end storage” for various OPM application, separate from the normal OPM 
network. Next, the attackers dropped a malware payload of the PlugX malware on fewer than 
10 OPM machines, but these machines included what is known as a “jumpbox,” which is the 
administrative server used to log into all other servers in OPM’s network.122 The attackers then 
moved laterally from the SQL server to other areas of the OPM network to then exfiltrate 
sensitive personnel, background check, and fingerprint data.123 
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3.1.3. DeepPanda’s Command and Control: PlugX and Sakula Family of Malware 
 Researchers have linked the activities involved in the data breaches discovered in April 
2015 to the group “DeepPanda,” another suspected state-sponsored threat-actor group.124 The 
command and control (C2) infrastructure used by the intruders in the OPM breach shared many 
of the same characteristics of the C2 infrastructure used in the OPM contractor breaches. This 
infrastructure consists of a series of thematically similar registered domain names traced back to 
registrants in China and two forms of malware that communicated with the Internet Protocol 
(IP) addresses associated with those domain names. The 2016 House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee notes that PlugX125 malware was used by the attackers from 
May into June 2014, which enabled the attackers to evade the May 27, 2014, “Big Bang” event 
that flushed out the first set of intruders from OPM’s systems. US-CERT had evidence from as 
early as July, 2014, that the attackers began to exfiltrate background investigation data using 
encrypted Roshal Archives (compressed files with the .RAR extension). The exfiltration of 
background check data continued until August, 2014. Several months later, on March 26, 2015, 
the attackers began exfiltrating fingerprint data from OPM’s network. 
 PlugX is a “remote-access tool commonly deployed by Chinese-speaking hacking 
units.”126 It contains modular plugins and allows the attacker to “log keystrokes; modify and 
copy files; capture screenshots or video of user activity; and perform administrative tasks such 
as terminating processes, logging off users, and rebooting victim machines.”127 US-CERT found 
evidence that the PlugX malware communicated with “opmsecurity.org,” another part of the C2 
infrastructure used for data exfiltration. In fact, the House investigation revealed that the PlugX 
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was deployed again into OPM’s systems on October 10, 2014, and then once more on January 
15, 2015, suggesting that “the attacker was continuously modifying and customizing PlugX in 
order to better customize the malware to OPM’s network environment, maintain access, and 
conceal malicious activities.”128  All of these actions point to the work of a sophisticated cyber 
actor that knows is technically competent and well-resourced to continue such operations. 
According to security researchers analyzing publicly available information, the links to the 
command and control infrastructure were also closely tied to the modus operandi of previous 
attacks on OPM contracts, including Anthem and Premera. In all of these breaches, researchers 
have high confidence that intruders also used Sakula malware to facilitate the exfiltration of 
files. The Sakula malware variant had a file signature to unique infrastructure specifically 
designed for persistence. 
The Sakula malware is a remote access trojan (RAT) for the Microsoft Windows platform 
that first surfaced in 2012 and used until 2015. Once infected, Sakula remains persistent by 
setting a Microsoft Windows registry key and installing itself as various new services. To avoid 
detection by a user on an infected system, Sakula uses Windows DLL (a software library) 
sideloading and masquerades itself as an antivirus software (Kaspersky or McAfee--a McAfee 
DLL was found by Brendon Saulsbury, the contractor who first detected suspicious 
communications activities from OPM’s network). Sakula also uses single-byte XOR, a binary 
logical operator, to disguise many of its files from the infected host operating system. Once 
installed, Sakula can use the Windows command line interface, download files remotely, delete 
temporary files, and perform cleanup. Sakula contains code to bypass Windows User Account 
Control, which allows it to run any program on an infected computer. Sakula communicates 
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with C2 infrastructure using HTTP and encodes outgoing C2 traffic with a custom 
cryptographic protocol (single-byte XOR) keys. 
The campaign that used the Sakula family of malware had many similarities to another 
campaign that targeted a Virginia-based defense contractor, VAE, Inc. There were also strong 
ties between the OPM incident and attacks with similar domain name registrations. These 
registrations included Marvel “Avengers” franchise themed first and last names and temporary 
email accounts of random alphabetic characters at the gmx.com domain name. Finally, 
independent security researchers indicated with a high degree of confidence that the kinds of 
breaches that USIS had experienced in 2013, as well as 2015 breaches of federal healthcare 
providers such as Anthem, Premera, Empire, and Carefirst, shared similar characteristics as the 
breach of OPM in July 2014. They were able to link the malware to an APT from China known 
as “Deep Panda,” which targeted similar PII data, such as names, employment history, and 
Social Security numbers that were also targeted in the healthcare provider breaches. Such 
evidence provides a stronger sense of correlation than mere coincidence.129 
3.2: Policy, Personnel, and Management Elements Leading to the Incidents 
 Three policy, personnel, and management elements were major contributions to the 
OPM data breach. First, a gap in technology leadership in OPM caused it to fail to properly 
heed previously warnings about its IT security practices, despite years of internal warnings and 
a pattern of similar malicious activity that affected its contractors. Second, OPM’s poor 
implementation of certain security practices (using available technical resources) made it more 
likely to be penetrated. Finally, issues in data access and management policies, particularly with 
contractors, made OPM more susceptible to a breach.  
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3.2.1. Lack of IT Leadership and Missed Warnings 
 While a shortage of specific cybersecurity expertise is by no means an indictment against 
the success of agency leadership, the fact pattern revealed in this paper shows that then-OPM 
Director Katherine Archuleta, several of her predecessors, and the Office of the Chief 
Information Officer (OIG) failed to prioritize the technology safety of OPM, amounting to a lack 
of IT leadership. Specifically, during the first and second breaches of OPM’s network in 2014 
and 2015, the OCIO failed to give timely notification to the OPM Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) of the 2014 and 2015 data breaches or whether the data were compromised; the OCIO 
failed to notify the OIG of major IT investments to develop a new IT infrastructure; and OPM 
did not disclose the September, 2014, breach of a major contractor, KeyPoint, to the OIG. 
Indeed, watchdog groups such as the OPM OIG may be stringent in evaluating agency 
compliance with certain federal standards, but the end result of such audits are to maintain 
high-quality government services. At the very least, the three missteps noted above indicate 
reluctance for OPM leadership at the time to coordinate the beginnings of an effective response.  
Furthermore, Office of Personnel management has “historically maintained a 
fragmented IT infrastructure, and still lacks a full, accurate inventory of all its major IT 
systems.” According to the 2016 House Oversight and Government Reform committee report, 
OPM “failed to sufficiently respond to growing threats of sophisticated cyber attackers;” “failed 
to prioritize resources for cybersecurity,” and largely ignored a 2005 warning from its Inspector 
General of the strategic and intelligence value of the sensitive data OPM holds on its employees 
and their family members.130 OPM’s management also missed warnings from the U.S. 
intelligence community dating to roughly 2010, when they expressed concerns about the 
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privacy, security, and data ownership impacts merging intelligence agency employees 
databases with OPM personnel data, citing the dangers exposing the PII of covert operatives in 
the field should hackers gain access to OPM systems.131 
 The fact pattern gleaned from contemporary news articles from the time demonstrates 
that malicious actors were already targeting the data of U.S. workers, whether they be federal 
employees or federal contractors. Public news outlets noted as early as July 2014 that the March 
2014 OPM “manuals” breach indicated that foreign actors were indeed interested in the PII of 
federal workers.132 Internally, OPM did respond by formulating counterintelligence activities 
and developing the “Big Bang” plans, but the timeline indicates that perhaps OPM leadership 
were overconfident in the “Big Bang” event’s ability to flush out attackers and missed the 
possibility that another malicious actor could have been inside OPM’s network. Despite the 
pattern of data breaches that overcame key OPM contractors noted above, including USIS, 
KeyPoint, Anthem, and Premera, it at least seems publicly that OPM leadership missed the 
connection between the contractors and the agency itself.133 Coupled with the warnings from 
the Inspector General’s FISMA audits, OPM’s leadership could have been more responsive to 
events at the time in relation to its recorded, historical weaknesses. 
3.2.2. Inadequate Implementation of Multifactor Authentication 
 A specific vulnerability (or perhaps, feature) within OPM’s network that hackers 
exploited was that any OPM employee or contractor could login with only a username and 
password. Using a stolen KeyPoint credential, attackers were able to login to OPM’s systems. 
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While this kind of single-factor, knowledge-based authentication is generally secure, multi-
factor authentication that has involves another form of user and identity verification enhances 
access controls.134 Multi-factor authentication requires a secondary or other form of 
authentication in addition to a username and password. Multi-factor authentication is a useful 
protection in the case a credential set with a username and a password is stolen or otherwise 
compromised, as the combination of a username and password alone would not be sufficient to 
access a system or gain entrance into a network. For the federal government, this multifactor 
authentication device was a PIV (Personal Identity Verification) card, an identification card 
containing a chip to be slotted into a reader when logging into an OPM system. OPM had 
worked to strengthen access controls with PIV multi-factor authentication as early as 
September, 2009.135 Unfortunately, OPM did not implement multi-factor authentication until 
January, 2015--over four years later--when attackers already had access to OPM’s network and 
deployed malware to exfiltrate the data.  
3.2.3. Data Management Policy Issues 
The records stolen in the breach resided in three different locations. First, background 
investigation was stored in the PIPS (Personnel Investigations Processing System) database. 
Second, fingerprint records were stored in OPM’s FTS (Fingerprint Transaction System). Third, 
OPM’s personnel information were not actually stored within OPM’s network but was actually 
housed within the Department of the Interior (DOI). PIPS and FTS, the two systems storing data 
within OPM’s network, relied on proper authorizations from the overall OPM network 
infrastructure to operate. Over the course of the House Oversight and Government Reform 
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Committee investigation, it was found that OPM’s LAN/WAN (Local Area Network/Wide 
Area Network) and ESI (Enterprise Server Infrastructure) environments, spread across OPM 
headquarters in Washington, D.C.; a data center in Boyers, Pennsylvania; and a backup data 
center in Macon, Georgia, were all running on expired Authorities to Operate.136 
More problematic was the fact that personnel records were hosted by the Department of 
the Interior, as hosting data in a separate facility exposes the second facility to much greater 
cyber risk. A remote desktop session enabled the hackers to tunnel into the DOI’s systems and 
to where the OPM personnel data was held. From a July 15, 2015 hearing, “Cybersecurity at the 
U.S. Department of Interior,” DOI leadership testified that “the adversary had access to [DOI’s] 
data center…[but] there was no evidenced based on the investigation that was led by DHS, US-
CERT, and the FBI… that the adversary had compromised any other data aside from the OPM 
data.”137 Nevertheless, such information storage practices unnecessarily jeopardized DOI, 
which hosted the data. If the attackers had been more aggressive, or had known about the DOI’s 
information system architecture, the scope of the breach could have been much greater.  
Furthermore, OPM took on increased risk from malicious cyber activities by not fully 
encrypting its IT systems. A lack of encryption was not for want of technical resources, but 
rather a lack of In a June 16, 2015 House Oversight and Government Reform Committee 
hearing, then-OPM Director Archuleta indicated that OPM had procured the tools for the 
encryption of its databases but that the agency encountered difficult in encrypting its legacy IT 
systems because the older hardware did not support such encryption schemes.138 Outside 
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security experts lamented that a lack of focus on the encryption of and proper access control to 
data but the encryption of systems reflected another management misdirection from the 
agency.139 Coincidentally, while the House report found that exfiltrated OPM’s data using 
encrypted .RAR files over a months-long span, OPM did not employ the same techniques to 
safeguard their own data records. 
3.3 In Context: Historical OPM Cybersecurity Preparedness and Posture 
 From 2007 to the present, OPM’s Office of the Inspector General has audited the 
agency’s FISMA (Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, amended in 2014 as 
the Federal Information Security Modernization Act) compliance. FISMA, first signed into law 
in Title III of the 2002 E-Government Act as the Federal Information Security Management Act 
and updated as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act in 2014. Specifically, 
FISMA “requires (1) annual agency program reviews, (2) annual Inspector General (IG) 
evaluations, (3) agency reporting to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the results of 
IG evaluations for unclassified systems, and (4) an annual OMB report to Congress 
summarizing the material received from agencies.”140 From 2007 to 2017, the OPM OIG issued a 
total of 287 recommendations. An aggregate analysis of the OIG’s publicly available, historical 
audit findings and recommendations from 2007 to 2017 shows two distinct periods in the 
recommendation data. The first period saw steady growth, then a peak, and a decline in 
information security-related deficiency findings recommendations in the first period from 2007 
to 2013. This trend was followed by a second period of a steadily high rate of recommendations 
in the OIG reports.141  
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Beginning with nine information-security related findings and recommendations in 
2007, the OPM OIG issued a record high of 41 recommendations related to FISMA compliance 
to the agency in 2010. The number of findings and recommendations tapered off consistent in 
the subsequent years, until hitting a low of 16 in 2013. Beginning in 2014 (with 29 
recommendations) to the present (the last OPM OIG FISMA report, released in 2017, contained 
39 recommendations for the agency), the OIG consistently found issues with OPM’s security 
posture and made topical recommendations accordingly. The OPM breaches occurred between 
2014 and 2015, so it is important to note that while FISMA recommendations and FISMA 
findings were above-average (with 29 and 27 recommendations made in those respective years), 
the audits conducted in those two years were by no means the most recommendation-heavy. 
Perhaps this pattern signals that both OPM leadership and the auditors in the OIG believed that 
certain information security weaknesses were adequately addressed, only to face one of the 
biggest cyberattacks in the U.S. federal government’s history.  
These 287 recommendations spanned 12 categories, including: 1) Agency Privacy 
Program (20, or 7% of all 287 recommendations); 2) Configuration Management; (68, or 24% of 
the total); 3) Contingency Planning (24, or 8%); 4) Contractor Systems (10, or 3%); 5) Identity, 
Credential, and Access Management (29, or 10%); 6) Incident Response Program (11, or 4%); 7) 
Information Security Continuous Monitoring (18, or 6%); 8) Information Security Governance 
(23, or 8%); 9) Plan of Action and Milestones (26, or 9%); 10) Risk Management (23, or 8%); 11) 
Security Assessment and Authorization; (26, or 9%) and 12) Security Training (9, or 3%).142 
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Many of these recommendations persisted over time, signaling that OPM took at least a year to 
address information security issues found by the OIG. 132--nearly half--of the recommendations 
made since 2007 by the OPM OIG were roll-forward recommendations that carried forward 
from a previous OIG audit or a series of past OIG audits. 155 of these 287 total 
recommendations (54%) were actually new recommendations made during the 2007 to 2017 
audit timeframe. 
Another measure of the integration of information security and cybersecurity thinking 
in an agency is how quickly they implement the recommendations contained in these FISMA 
reports. For all 287 recommendations made in the set, each recommendation has an average life 
of approximately 2.79 years. The average lifespan of a recommendation drops to 1.74 years 
when considering only the 155 unique, new recommendations per report year. Of the 155 
unique recommendations from 2007 to 2017, a total of 116 have been closed, taking an average 
of 1.52 years to close each recommendation. 39 unique recommendations remain open for OPM 
to implement; these recommendations are on average slightly over two years old. A graphic of 
the total recommendations over time is provided on the next page.
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Interestingly, closed, unique recommendations outnumber open, unique 
recommendations by almost a factor of three to one. On average, however, it has taken less time 
to implement these same closed recommendations given by the OIG than the remaining, open 
ones. The OIG has issued several recommendations that have remained open for a 
disproportionate amount of time, suggesting specific historical weaknesses in OPM’s 
cybersecurity preparedness in those recommendation areas. If the number of FISMA audit 
recommendations can be assumed to be a proxy by which the public can measure OPM’s 
security preparedness in the years following the breach, two possible insights emerge. First, 
auditors in the OIG, cognizant of the cybersecurity weaknesses that led to the breaches may 
have more heavily scrutinized OPM’s information security preparedness after incident and 
uncovered more problems that were not there before. Secondly, based on OPM’s FISMA audit 
performance in the years following the breaches to their systems, the agency’s historical 
information security and cybersecurity weaknesses still have not been adequately addressed. 
3.3.1. Agency Privacy Program 
 OPM’s Agency Privacy Program audit by the OIG included an evaluation of OPM’s 
privacy impact assessment process and its privacy program’s progress in implementing OMB 
Memorandum M-06-15. Privacy impact assessments (PIAs) have been required of any federal 
agencies that process personally identifiable information (PII). OMB Memorandum M-06-15 
“requires agencies to review the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that protect 
PII.”143 The OIG issued a total of 20 (7% of the 287 total) recommendations related to OPM’s 
agency privacy program from 2007 to 2017. Of those 20, 11 were new recommendations over the 
course of the recommendations dataset, and nine of the recommendations rolled forward. 
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OPM audit reports indicate that the first agency privacy program recommendations 
were made in 2007. For the most part, concerns with OPM’s privacy program peaked in 2009, 
with give recommendations. Aside from three recommendations made in 2011, no new 
recommendations have been made about the agency privacy program since that year. OPM 
performed the strongest in its agency privacy program, as all recommendations have been 
marked closed since 2014. On average, OPM took 1.84 years to close these recommendations.  
3.3.2. Configuration Management 
 Configuration management allows organizations to establish system baseline standards, 
securely manage changes to configuration settings, and monitor system software across the 
organization. For OPM, configuration management involves developing and maintaining 
“baseline [federal information technology] configurations and approved standard configuration 
settings for its information systems.”144 Within the latest OPM OIG report, configuration 
management findings were an extensive look into the state of OPM’s IT infrastructure 
preparedness and involved several metrics, including configuration management roles, 
responsibilities, and resources; developing configuration management plans; implementation of 
policies and procedures; baseline configurations; security configuration settings; flaw 
remediation and patch management; the trusted internet connection program; and 
configuration control management.145 
 Configuration management has historically been a weakness for OPM to handle. Over 
the 2007 to 2017 period, the OIG issued 68 total recommendations related to configuration 
management to OPM. Related findings and recommendations were the most often made across 
unique recommendations by the OIG, with 34 unique recommendations (22% of the 155 unique 
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recommendations) from 2007 to 2017. The other 34 were rolled over during the timespan.  Each 
year contained at least one new configuration management-related recommendation. The most 
number of configuration management recommendations made by the OIG was six, in both 2009 
and 2014. Of these 34 recommendations, 23 (slightly over two-thirds) have been closed since 
they were open, each taking an average of 1.64 years to implement. 
However, on average, the 11 remaining recommendations have stayed open for an 
average of slightly over two years. Five of the 11 recommendations are from the 2014 OIG 
FISMA audit and are tied as the longest roll-forward recommendations in the configuration 
management category, having each been open for more than three years. These 
recommendations include priorities such as developing and implementing standard 
configuration settings for all operating systems platforms in use by OPM, conducting routine 
compliance scans for all OPM servers and databases, ensuring routine vulnerability scanning on 
all OPM network-connected devices, tracking security weaknesses during vulnerability scans, 
and applying operating systems and third-party vendor patches in a timely manner. Most 
recently, the OIG has noted that OPM has also been “working to establish routine audit 
processes to ensure that its systems maintain compliance with established configurations.”146 
3.3.3. Contingency Planning 
 Contingency planning enables organizations to ensure the “adequate availability” of 
information systems, data, and business processes. FISMA contingency planning requirements 
include contingency planning roles and responsibilities, contingency planning policies and 
procedures, business impact analysis, contingency plan maintenance, contingency plan testing, 
information system backup and storage, communication of recovery activities.147 The OIG 
                                                 
146 “Federal Information Security Modernization Act Audit Fiscal Year 2017,” ii. 
147 Ibid., 46-50 
 59 
found that OPM has not implemented FISMA contingency planning recommendations, “and 
continues to struggle” with such recommendations on a routine basis.148 
 According to the dataset, the OIG issued 24 total contingency planning-related 
recommendations to OPM from 2007 to 2017. Of these 24, OPM was only given nine unique 
recommendations (roughly 6% of new recommendations year-over-year from the OIG) on 
contingency planning over the past ten years. OPM has made significant progress in 
implementing these nine recommendations, having closed six in an average of 1.8 years per 
recommendation. The three open recommendations in the contingency planning category 
include testing contingency plans for each OPM systems annually, ensuring that all of OPM’s 
systems actually have contingency plans in place, and incorporating business impact analysis 
into the results of system-level contingency plans. The oldest roll-forward recommendation 
dates from November 2012 and has been open for over five years; this recommendation calls for 
OPM to simply test contingency plans for each systems it owns on an annual basis. As the OIG 
concludes, “OPM’s failure to test the contingency plans for almost 90 percent of its systems is a 
symptom of the significant deficiency in the agency’s information security governance 
structure.”149  
3.3.4. Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) 
 Identity, credential, and access management (ICAM) is a “Government-wide effort to 
help Federal agencies provision access to systems and facilities for the right person, at the right 
time, for the right reason.”150 ICAM efforts do not explicitly target contractor access, as they 
seek to establish broader guidelines for system permissions of all users of federal IT systems, 
focusing on the people, processes, and technology related to the digital enterprise. The ICAM 
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category includes the subcategories of assigning personnel risk, defining access agreements for 
privileged users on OPM-affiliated systems, multi-factor authentication with PIV, strong 
authentication mechanisms for privileged users, management of privileged user accounts, 
current and former employee information access, and contractor access management.  
 ICAM-related recommendations form a significant subset of the total recommendations 
made from 2007 to 2017 (39 of 287, or 14%) and constitute a similar portion of the unique 
recommendations made from 2007 to 2017 (22 of 155, or 14%). The total number in this category 
rank third in the set of all recommendations and the set of all unique recommendations issued 
by the OPM from 2007 to 2017. Including roll-forwards, 17 ICAM-related recommendations 
have been closed since 2007, each taking roughly an average of 1.3 years each to close. The five 
remaining have been open for at least 1.6 years, on average. Two weaknesses in these five 
remaining recommendations stand out: multi-factor authentication to access major information 
systems and keeping track of contractors with access to OPM’s systems. The longest open 
recommendation was first issued in 2012 and recommends that OPM require multi-factor 
authentication using PIV credentials. The second-longest open recommendation was first issued 
in 2016 and calls for OPM’s OCIO to maintain a centralized list of contractors that have access to 
OPM’s network and routinely audit the user accounts on the list. 
As of the 2017 FISMA audit, the OIG has not issued any specific contractor 
management-related recommendations and OPM has been “ensuring that an auditing process 
is implemented for all contractor access.”151 However, managing contractor systems has been a 
historical weakness for OPM since at least 2007. Not only do FISMA requirements pertain to 
agency-owned IT systems and resources, but they also pertain to “IT resources owned and/or 
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operated by a contractor support agency systems.”152 In 2016, the OPM OIG noted that “several 
information security agreements and memoranda of understanding between OPM and 
contractor-operated information systems have expired,”153 pointing to a weakness in the 
management of contractors by the agency. On paper, however, it seems that OPM’s efforts to 
curb issues in contractor systems have been largely successful. Historically, the OIG has only 
made 10 overall recommendations (3% of the 287 total) and five unique recommendations (3% 
of the 155 total unique) pertaining to the sub-category of contractor systems. All five of these 
unique recommendations have been closed as of 2017, taking an average of 0.86 years to close. 
 Looking more closely, the longest of these contractor systems recommendations 
originated from the 2009 OIG report and was rolled forward until the 2011 OIG report. OPM 
spent two years to develop a policy for adequate oversight of contractor-operated systems. 
Another outlier was a recommendation related to identifying agency systems residing in a 
public cloud and including those systems in a master system inventory; this recommendation 
was made in the 2014 OIG and was marked closed immediately upon publication. OPM’s 
performance in the contractor systems category appears better in the reports than in real life. 
OPM’s specific contractor system compliance outlook improved just as it was being breached 
via contractor access, suggesting that perhaps this piece fell through the cracks of the FISMA 
auditing process as the agency geared towards broader focus on access management. As part of 
a multi-stage cyber espionage operation, adversaries were only able to access OPM’s employee 
data, background check database, and fingerprint records by gaining unauthorized access 
through KeyPoint contractor credentials. Better managing contractor systems and contractor 
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access will remain crucial as part of OPM’s security efforts moving forward. Thus, OPM’s 
historical weaknesses specific to contractor systems still largely remain as it grapples with 
strengthening access management in general. 
3.3.5. Incident Response Program 
 Incident response programs help organizations detect cybersecurity incidents, minimize 
loss and destruction in such incidents, mitigating exploited vulnerabilities, and restoring 
availability of IT services.154 OPM’s incident response program reflects a whole-of-government 
approach in approaching cyber incidents, as FISMA requires federal agencies to establish 
incident response programs and also requires civilian federal agencies to contact the U.S. 
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to “report all incidents consistent with the 
agency’s incident response policy.”155 US-CERT, rolled into the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), housed within the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, aims to “reduce the risk of systemic cybersecurity and communications challenges” by 
serving “as a national hub for cyber and communications information, technical expertise, and 
operational integration, and by operating [the NCCIC] 24/7 situational awareness, analysis, and 
incident response center.”156 OPM has been successful in implementing an incident response 
plan, having no open recommendations in the category in the OIG’s latest report. Historically, 
OPM was issued 11 total recommendations (4% of the 287 total), with nine of them unique 
recommendations over the years (6% of the 155 unique total). The earliest concerns from the 
OIG on OPM’s incident response was 2007, with two recommendations, but by 2017, OPM had 
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closed all open recommendations made in the category, taking an average of less than a year to 
close each recommendation. The OIG’s concerns mainly centered around internal notification of 
IT security incidents by employees and contractors, channeling these incident reports upward 
to OPM leadership, logging, efforts to monitor security events, and building tools to optimize 
the collection of relevant data for incident response. Indeed, the OIG noted in 2017 that “OPM 
has an effective incident response program.”157  
3.3.6. Information Security Continuous Monitoring 
Information security continuous monitoring (ISCM) involves “the ongoing assessment 
of the effectiveness of information security controls in support of [OPM’s] efforts to manage 
security vulnerabilities and threats.”158 The ISCM process involves security controls testing and 
monitoring, processes for ongoing security control assessments and system authorizations, and 
identifying and defining what constitute effective performance measures for ISCM. From 2007 
to 2017, OPM was issued 18 ISCM-related recommendations by the OIG (6% of the 287 total). 12 
of these 18 recommendations were unique, meaning six were roll-forward recommendations. 
The first of these was issued in 2008, and the latest two in this category were issued in 2017. 
Nine of the unique recommendations were closed over the course of 2011 to 2017, taking an 
average of almost 0.9 years to satisfy OIG concerns. However, the three open ISCM-related 
recommendations have been open for an average of almost 3.5 years, nearly four times as long 
as the time it took for OPM to implement solutions for the closed recommendations. The chief 
culprit among these open recommendations is a recommendation dating back from 2008. In the 
2008 FISMA audit, the OIG recommended that OPM test security controls for all of its systems 
on an annual basis, and in the nine-and-a-half-year since, the agency still has not closed this 
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recommendation. Unfortunately, ISCM has not been a strong suit for the agency, as the OIG 
writes in 2017, “OPM must consistently test its systems’ security before it can implement a 
mature continuous monitoring program.”159 
3.3.7. Information Security Governance 
Information security governance primarily focuses on “identifying key roles and 
responsibilities and managing information security policy development, oversight, and ongoing 
monitoring activities.”160 From 2007 to 2013, the OPM Inspector General found that information 
security governance was a “material weakness” within OPM. While OPM centralized a 
cybersecurity program under a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) in the intervening 
years between 2013 and 2017, it continued to struggle to implement FISMA requirements. In 
fact, the 2017 OIG report noted that "when OPM makes progress in one cybersecurity domain, it 
does so at the expense of another.”161 Historically, the OIG has issued a total of 23 (8% of 287) 
recommendations pertaining to OPM’s information security governance, starting first in 2007 
and continuing with one related recommendation each year through 2017. These 23 
recommendations whittle down to 11 (7% of 155) after filtering out roll-forward 
recommendations. Most (10) of these unique recommendations have been closed by OPM, with 
the agency taking an average of 2.4 years to close them. The remaining single open 
recommendation has not seen any progress for nearly 1.4 years since its issue. OPM spent more 
than four years to implement three of the 10 closed recommendations. In these three 
recommendations, the OIG saw issues with OPM accurately indicating its security position, 
with implementing a centralized information security governance structure, and with OPM’s 
CIO developing and regularly publishing up-to-date and comprehensive IT security policies 
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and procedures. Overall, the OIG laments that “OPM is not making substantial progress in 
implementing prior OIG FISMA recommendations.”162 
3.3.8. Risk Management 
 Risk management allows OPM to “understand and control risks associated with its IT 
infrastructure and services.”163 Keeping track of system inventories and system 
interconnections, managing hardware and software inventories, determining system security 
categorizations, defining risk policy and strategy, designing an information security 
architecture, and setting risk management roles, responsibilities, and resources are all part of 
risk management policies for OPM.164 This category also includes plan of action and milestones 
tool use (POA&Ms), conducting system level risk assessments, timely risk communication, and 
contracting clauses that meet federal and OPM requirements and standards. The OIG has 
emphasized in the 2017 FISMA audit that OPM does not have a tool to view centralized, 
enterprise-wide risk information, and, “despite a long history of troubled system development 
projects, OPM still does not consistent enforce a comprehensive [system development life 
cycle].”165 Risk management has remained an issue plaguing OPM’s IT systems in the dataset.  
 In fact, OPM has consistently underperformed in the risk management category in 
historical OIG findings. More specifically, from the total of 49 risk management-related 
recommendations (17% of 287, or nearly one-fifth), 28 of those 49 are unique recommendations 
year-over-year (18% of 155, also nearly one-fifth). Risk management is the second-highest 
occurring recommendation category in the OIG’s FISMA audits. Between 2007 to 2017, OPM 
has only closed 16 (just over half) of these recommendations, taking 1.66 years on average. Of 
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the 12 remaining open recommendations, six were issued in 2017. However, this subset of 
recommendations has been open for so long that on average, risk management issues have 
remained open for nearly two years. The oldest open recommendation was first issued in 2011, 
and the second oldest was first issued in 2013. The former recommendation involves OPM 
continuing to develop its risk executive function, while the latter urges OPM to develop a plan 
and timeline to enforce a new system development lifecycle policy on all development projects 
to avoid technical issues. Furthermore, these 12 open recommendations actually constitute the 
biggest subset (31%) of the 39 unique, open recommendations issued from 2007 to 2017. Put 
simply, a lack of attention to risk management within OPM has certainly exposed the 
organization to more risk from improper usage and intrusions. 
 The plan of action and milestones (POA&M) tool comprises a significant part of the risk 
management process. A POA&M “is a tool used to assist agencies in identifying, assessing, 
prioritizing, and monitoring the progress of correct efforts for IT security weaknesses.”166 
According to the OPM OIG, POA&Ms “incorporate all known IT security weaknesses,” 
prioritize addressing significant IT security weaknesses, call for effective remediation plans as 
well as adherence to remediation deadlines, identify resources to remediate weaknesses, and 
include documentation or “proof of closure” indicating that a specific IT weakness has been 
resolved.167 As of 2017, OPM has closed all recommendations in POA&M-related sub-
categories. In general, however, POA&M-related recommendations have also historically been 
an OPM weakness, with a total of 26 issued by the OIG (9% of 287) and 14 of the 26 (9% of 155) 
being unique recommendations that have taken, on average, 1.75 years to implement. 
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 Four of these POA&M-related recommendations each took OPM three years or more to 
close. These four recommendations (and associated time to implementation) were in response to 
the following three issues found by the OIG: (1) that the OPM OCIO and program offices with 
information systems were not incorporating security weaknesses into appropriate POA&Ms (an 
issue actually discovered twice--once in 2008 and closed in 2011, another time in 2012 and 
closed in 2016 ); (2) that the OPM OCIO and system owners not develop formal action plans to 
remediate POA&M weaknesses (taking 3.1 years to implement); and (3) and that each IT system 
owner neither had had an up-to-date POA&M nor regularly submitted an updated POA&M for 
corresponding systems in OPM’s inventory (taking 3.1 years to resolve). The last POA&M-
related recommendation was closed in 2016, but two new POA&M recommendations were 
issued by the OIG in the latest FISMA audit.  
3.3.9. Security Assessment and Authorization 
 Security assessment and authorization is required by both OPM policy and National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guidance. This category in the FISMA audit 
involves a comprehensive assessment of whether a system’s security controls meet 
requirements and “an attestation that the system risks are at an acceptable level.”168 The OIG 
noted that while “[p]revious FISMA audits identified a material weakness in OPM’s 
Authorization process related to incomplete, inconsistent, and sub-par work products”169 and 
that OPM had worked to resolve some of those same issues, the watchdog ultimately 
“reinstated the material weakness related to this issue in [the] FY 2015 FISMA audit.”170 While  
OPM has made some improvements in the authorization process for its systems, issues remain. 
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As the OIG warns, “The lack of an Authorization can indicate that security controls are not 
operating effectively or that there are unacceptable levels of risk in a system.”171  
 Between 2007 to 2017, the OIG issued 26 security assessment and authorization-related 
recommendations (9% of the 287 total). Of those 26, 12 are unique recommendations that were 
not roll-forward recommendations (8% of the 155 unique). With 10 of these recommendations 
now closed (the earliest in 2009, the latest in 2017), two open recommendations in the category 
remain. OPM indeed made progress on these recommendations between 2009 to 2012, closing a 
total of nine recommendations in that timespan. However, the two remaining open 
recommendations have been open for an average of 3.38 years. Both of these recommendations 
were issued in 2014. One centers around the certification and accreditation (C&A) process of IT 
systems. The other involves specific authorization errors first identified in 2011 but later 
brought up in 2014. Overall, open recommendations in the security assessment and 
authorization category are the second worst-performing, after the information security 
continuous monitoring category. 
3.3.10. Security Training 
 OPM earned good marks from the OIG for its security training program. FISMA 
requires all government employees and contractors to undergo IT security training annually 
and requires IT security-specific employees to take specialized training related to their job 
function.172 Furthermore, the OIG notes that “OPM has a strong history of providing its 
employees with IT security awareness training for the ever changing risk environment and has 
made progress in providing tailored training to those with significant security 
responsibilities.”173 Security training involves dedicated policies and procedures, ways to assess 
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the “knowledge, skills and abilities of its workforce” training needs,174 security awareness 
strategy, specialized security training policies, and tracking both general and specialized IT 
security training. 
 Over the years, the OIG has issued OPM a total of nine security training-related 
recommendations (3% of 287 total). Of those nine recommendations, seven have been unique 
recommendations not rolled-forward from previous years. Five of the seven unique 
recommendations have been implemented by OPM in an average of 1.19 years. The remaining 
two open recommendations are from the 2017 OIG FISMA audit and involve conducting 
assessments of workforce security awareness and developing a more tailored security 
awareness and training strategy. However, with over 96% of OPM employees and contractors 
having completed security awareness training, the agency has demonstrated sure progress in 
completing various training requirements.175 
3.3.11. Current Open Recommendations 
Despite the Office of Personnel Management’s historical weaknesses in information 
security, changes promulgated in the years following the OPM data breaches have still not 
significantly improved the agency’s cybersecurity efforts. According to the OPM Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG), which issues semi-annual reports to Congress on agency compliance, 
as of September 30, 2017, there were 214 outstanding policy recommendations that were yet to 
be implemented.176 These 214 recommendations were made across 50 reports consisting of six 
types: (1) Internal Operations Audits; (2) Information Systems Audits; (3) Experience-Rated 
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Insurance Audits; (4) Community-Rated Insurance Audits; (5) Combined Federal Campaign 
Audits; and (6) Evaluations.177 
Based on the performance of OPM in accordance to OIG information security audits, 
information technology remains a lesser priority for the organization. Recommendations from 
the “Information Systems Audits” category comprised a disproportionate number: 107 (50%) of 
the 214 total outstanding recommendations. All 107 of these unimplemented recommendations 
fall under the 188 recommendations that OPM and OIG consider to be procedural 
recommendations rather than monetary recommendations. Furthermore, from the 214 total 
recommendations, the remaining 26 monetary recommendations have encompassed an 
estimated total cost savings of $193,730,170, potentially signaling the organizational priority of 
OPM when carrying out implementation post OIG reports.178 If the second-order or even third-
order savings from carrying out procedural recommendations could be calculated, the 
valuation of cost savings from implementing information security and cybersecurity-related 
recommendations would arguably increase. 
Of the 107 outstanding Information Systems Audits recommendations, 70 (65%) relate to 
Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) audits. Contemporary FISMA audits 
review the information security posture of various agencies according to the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s (DHS) FISMA Inspector General Reporting Metrics.179 Internal documents 
of OPM’s information systems remain confidential and out of public reach, so analyzing the 
performance of OPM with regards to the OIG FISMA audits gauges the historical performance 
of OPM in accordance to federally mandated standards of information security. A majority (52 
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of these 70) of these open FISMA recommendations were made between fiscal year 2014 to fiscal 
year 2016.180  
3.4. Evaluation of Technical, Management, and Compliance Factors 
 In the years leading up to the OPM data breaches, the agency struggled with its fair 
share of technical issues and management difficulties. OPM failed to detect the technical 
elements of the incidents, including the specific malware infections and the communications it 
had with command and control infrastructure until several months after it was initially infected, 
after tens of millions of records were already exfiltrated. However, as the timeline in the 
previous chapter demonstrates, OPM was quick to remedy the intrusions with the help of US-
CERT after the breaches were detected. This sequence of events suggests that at the time, OPM 
had greater weaknesses in the detection aspect of the defensive cybersecurity model, but more 
prowess in the containment and decontamination parts. 
On the management side, OPM’s lack of IT expertise within its leadership caused it to 
miss earlier warnings of potential breaches, including the breaches of its closest contractors in 
investigative services and healthcare. Despite having a directive to implement PIV cards as part 
of the login process, the agency did not adequately implement multi-factor authentication until 
months after the attackers’ initial entry. Multi-factor authentication would have prevented a 
critical stolen contractor credential from being used in gaining access to the rest of OPM’s 
servers. Moreover, as a matter of management, OPM neither consistently stored its data within 
its own premises nor did it encrypt all of its systems. 
OPM’s FISMA compliance history from 2007 to 2017 gives more weight to the narrative 
that the agency faced more management mishaps than technical troubles. Countless 
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information security-related recommendations from the OPM Inspector General had rolled-
forward for several years, indicating management issues in areas of system configuration 
management; identity, credential, and access management; and risk management. The longest 
such open recommendation was first issued in September 2008 and recommends OPM to 
“ensure that an annual test of security controls has been completed for all systems.” The multi-
factor authentication issue has re-emerged in recent OIG reports, with a recommendation from 
November 2012 recommending the agency to upgrade its major information systems to require 
multi-factor authentication using PIV credentials still open to this day. Lastly, despite a change 
in leadership, OPM’s management remains unable to test contingency plans for each of the 
agency’s systems on an annual basis, a finding that has persisted for nearly five-and-a-half 
years as of this paper’s printing. These findings are not prohibitively expensive to implement, 
nor are they technically challenging. Rather, the narrative that emerges from this compliance 
history, coupled with the technical and management details from the fact patterns discussed 
earlier, demonstrates that a lack of prioritization of information security measures from OPM’s 
leadership and management cascaded over time into greater problems that ultimately enabled 
the intruders to hit the “mother lode.” 
Today, OPM’s management woes extend are seen by entities other than its Inspector 
General. According to a Government Accountability Office report on OPM’s information 
security posture released in August, 2017, while OPM “has improved its security posture and is 
in the process of taking numerous actions, such as addressing recommendations from US-CERT 
and implementing government-wide requirements and initiatives that could decrease the risk 
of future security breaches if effectively implemented.”181 Its improvements are spotty: OPM 
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has not conducted periodic control assessments, has not ensured proper training on the use of 
monitoring tools, and not comprehensively tested security controls on even a select set of 
contractor systems.182 If OPM cannot even play “catch-up” game on information security 
compliance nearly three years after the 2015 data breaches, how can it expect to keep up with 
the ever-evolving world of online threat actors?  
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Part Four: Lessons Learned and Future Recommendations 
 Having triaged the technical and management factors that contributed to the OPM data 
breaches, this paper now (1) looks at the short-term impacts of the breaches; (2) examines the 
long-term implications; (3) provides a brief overview of recent U.S. federal government efforts 
to improve cybersecurity; and (4) offers recommendations based on the lessons learned to 
improve OPM’s future cybersecurity preparedness. 
4.1. Short-Term Impact of the OPM Data Breaches 
 The short-term impact of the OPM data breaches were threefold. First, over 30 million 
total records were lost, between current and former personnel data, background investigation 
information, and fingerprints. However, whether those records lost contained specific 
intelligence community PII remains unknown, as the publicly available paper trail ends with 
the OPM losses. Second, the immediate political ramifications resulted in a shakeup of 
leadership. Former OPM Director Katherine Archuleta resigned in June 2015 and, a few months 
later, Donna Seymore, then-CIO of OPM, resigned in February 2016. These high-level 
leadership departures would later result in a revolving door of leadership not addressed until 
nearly three years later. Third, there were also short-term international relations impacts as the 
U.S. government began the attribution process, linking the OPM breaches to cyber actors 
associated with the Chinese government.  
4.1.1. Lost Data 
On June 4, 2015, OPM announced that the personnel data of approximately 4.2 million 
current and former federal employees were compromised in a cyber incident discovered earlier 
that year and offered to provide “credit report access, credit monitoring, and identity theft 
insurance and recovery services to potentially affected individuals” for the following 18 
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months.183 Five days later, OPM announced that an incident from late May, 2015, resulted in a 
breach of the sensitive background investigation information of 21.5 million individuals, 
including Social Security Numbers, residency and education history, employment history, 
criminal, and financial history, among many other highly sensitive personal details.184 Of the 
21.5 million records stolen, 19.7 million records contained data of “current, former, and 
prospective employees and contractors who applied for a background investigation in 2000 and 
after.”185 The other 1.8 million records were of non-applicants “married or otherwise 
cohabitating with background investigation applications.”186 Furthermore, in September 2015, 
OPM confirmed the loss of 5.6 million fingerprint record, five times as many records as 
previously thought.187 
In fiscal year 2014, OPM began working with the intelligence community’s National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center’s (NCSC) Special Security Directorate (SSD) to compile 
and process data from the Office of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) “Scattered Castles” (SC) 
repository; the Department of Defense’s Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS); and 
OPM’s Central Verification System. OPM and the intelligence community collaborated to 
upload “active, completed clearance records from CVS to SC.”188 Despite worry by security 
professionals that the SC database, which contains extremely sensitive intelligence community 
PII, would be similarly compromised, U.S. officials have not confirmed nor denied that the link 
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between OPM’s CVS and ODNI’s was bidirectional. Without more publicly available details 
about SC, it is hard to make a determination as to whether the perpetrators of the OPM 
breaches did indeed have access to SC while they were inside OPM’s systems. 
4.1.2. Political Ramifications 
 Almost immediately after the data breaches were announced publicly, bipartisan 
criticism emerged over OPM’s handling of the incidents. The political ramifications of the OPM 
data breaches involved a change in leadership at the agency, resulting in a multi-year 
leadership vacuum following the resignations of Director Archuleta in July 2015 and Chief 
Information Officer Donna Seymour in February 2016. This leadership vacuum included both 
the Office of the Director and the Office of the Chief Information Officer. 
 OPM took almost three years to appoint a permanent successor to Archuleta. Beth 
Cobert served as Acting Director of OPM from July 2015 until January 19, 2017, near the very 
end of the Obama administration. Succeeding Cobert was Kathleen McGettigan, who served in 
the Acting Director role from January 19, 2017 until March 9, 2018, when Jeff Pon, the current 
permanent Director of OPM, began his tenure. OPM took six months before announcing the 
replacement CIO to Donna Seymour after her resignation in February, 2016, naming David 
DeVries to the position in August that August.189 DeVries would leave OPM only thirteen 
months later, in September 2017.190 OPM named its current CIO David Garcia to the position in 
October, 2017.191 Notably, both OPM Director Pon and CIO Garcia have some background in 
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technology, perhaps forecasting a future in which the cybersecurity conversation remains at the 
OPM leadership’s table. 
4.1.3. Monetary Costs 
 OPM awarded two contracts to two different private firms to provide credit monitoring 
and identity protection services to victims shortly after notifying them of the breach. For 4.2 
million current and federal employees who had their personnel information stolen, OPM 
awarded a contract worth $20 million to an identity protection firm named CSID to provide 18 
months of protection.192 OPM awarded a $133 million contract to the firm ID Experts to provide 
credit monitoring to the 21.5 million victims who had their background checks compromised.193 
OPM also requested that the Department of Defense provide up to $132 million to pay for 
further identity protection and background investigation.194 In OPM’s haste to alert victims and 
provide protection services, OPM may have both overestimated the cost of identity protection 
services and failed to consider duplication costs in the case that the same individual’s 
information happened to be in both sets of records.195 
On paper, with both OPM and DoD shouldering costs, the cost of handling the breach’s 
aftermath totals upwards of $285 million. More pessimistic experts have estimated that the total 
costs could exceed $1 billion.196 Such a figure suggests that certain audit methodologies may not 
properly estimate the risks associated with a cyber breach. Recalling that the OPM OIG’s 
remaining open information technology recommendations would yield an estimated $0 in 
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savings from the OIG’s September 30, 2017 report, perhaps future estimates of the cost savings 
of IT-related recommendations can include the potential costs of second- or third-order effects 
in the case that they are not implemented, and another major breach occurs. 
4.1.4. International Relations Impacts 
 In the months immediately after news broke of the OPM breaches, many U.S. officials 
indirectly attributed the incidents to China, while private-sector security researchers were more 
public with their attribution. For nation-state governments and especially for the United States, 
the difficulty in attribution lies in its being a balancing act: more attention and resources 
dedicated to attribution make it easier, but adversaries are catching on, knowing that false flags 
may be planted. But attribution lies beyond just the technical domain; many nations have the 
requisite technical forensics capabilities to make an attribution judgment, but uncertainty in 
attribution is “a political and policy matter rather than a technical one.”197 Given the delicate 
balancing act between technical certainty and political prudence in attribution, perhaps it was 
in the context of an upcoming state visit in September 2015 by Chinese President Xi Jinping that 
drove U.S. policymakers to avoid direct attribution immediately after the fact.  
 As the Obama administration mulled over its possible options in the wake of the 
breach,198 complicating the international relations impact of the breach was the United States’ 
distinction between cyber intrusions for national security purposes (which merits a 
counterintelligence response) and cyber intrusions for commercial purposes (which the United 
States would prefer a criminal justice response). On September 25, 2015, during the Chinese 
state visit, both Presidents Obama and Xi agreed to a deal that would stop cyber espionage 
between the two countries, including intellectual property, trade secrets, or other confidential 
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business information.199 The two Presidents also agreed to establish high-level joint dialogue to 
fight cybercrime and related issues.200 A more direct attribution or an escalatory response 
would have come at the risk of losing the agreement from September 2015. Furthermore, the 
early December 2015 arrests of the supposed hackers behind the OPM breach by the Chinese 
government all but confirmed that the OPM breach came from China, direct attributability of 
the breach to the government notwithstanding.201 
4.2. Long-Term Implications of the Incidents 
4.2.1. Lagging Federal Background Check Performance 
 Background checks for clearance investigations were temporarily suspended in the 
aftermath of the 2015 OPM breach, as the agency worked to clean up the results of the breach. 
After OPM decided to terminate a contractor relationship with USIS, a contractor that then 
“accounted for 60 percent of the federal government’s investigative capacity around 
background checks,… OPM has been playing catch up ever since.”202Indeed, since the OPM 
breach, there has been a growing backlog of incomplete background check investigations. In 
2016, OPM reported that there were roughly 570,000 unfinished clearances. As of July, 2017, 
there were as many as 690,000 incomplete investigations in the backlog. Just a month later, in 
August, 2017, that backlog grew to more than 700,000. 
In fact, as of March 2017, it took an average of 450 days to conclude a top secret security 
clearance. Worse yet, in a June 15, 2017, memo, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
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discontinued a set of Obama-era reporting standards in a memorandum that made it much 
more difficult to track OPM’s progress in working through its increasing backlog.203 This 
backlog will result in a shortage of skilled, young, and cleared contractor or federal employees 
that would serve elsewhere; may ignite a “talent war” and disrupt government work; and 
might drive up wages for existing workers who already have security clearances.204 
4.2.2. Stolen Data Has Not Been Shared or Sold 
 When news of the OPM breaches first broke, cybersecurity experts feared that the theft 
of personally identifiable information (PII) would be used for identity theft or other financially 
motivated cybercrime.205 In the days after the breach, a database supposedly from the OPM 
breach containing a user database exclusively of .gov (U.S. government-related) user accounts 
floated around in cybercrime circles. However, security researchers were quick to debunk such 
claims. They found that the data leak was from an unrelated cybersecurity incident in 
September 2013, when UNICOR.gov, a wholly owned United States government corporation 
also known as Federal Prison industries, discovered unauthorized access to its public website.206 
Fortunately, over two years afterwards, in September 2017, William Evanina, Director of 
the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, reassured the public in an interview 
with Bloomberg that the millions of data records, including Social Security numbers and 
fingerprints, from the OPM data breaches have not been “shared or sold by the perpetrators.”207 
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While Evanina was hesitant to confirm that the cyber incidents originated from China, he was 
confident that the personally identifiable information had not been otherwise distributed online 
as no evidence that those pieces of data had been improperly used in the context of cybercrime. 
4.2.3. Counterintelligence Implications 
While there have been few indications that the records stolen from OPM have been 
leveraged by the attackers or otherwise exploited, any theft of personally identifiable 
information from a government source has profound implications for that nation-state’s 
intelligence efforts. For members of the United States intelligence community undercover 
abroad, having personal details exposed could result in their compromise. 
In late September 2015, the Washington Post reported that the Central Intelligence 
Agency pulled officers from the U.S. Embassy in Beijing as a precautionary measure, as 
comparing the background checks of State Department employees and cross-referencing those 
records with embassy personnel could lead to potential CIA officers undercover.208 
Interestingly, in early November, 2015, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
indicated that the CIA did not pull officers from Beijing, directly contradicting previous 
reports.209 Despite these inconsistencies, this episode remains a lesson to be learned for 
counterintelligence implications in the aftermath of the OPM breach. As the tens of millions of 
records are still out there, the impacts of the breach will nevertheless be a latent concern for the 
U.S. intelligence community in the years to come. 
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4.3. Recent Federal Government Cybersecurity Policies 
4.3.1. Obama Administration Initiatives 
 Although OPM’s information security posture and preparedness have historically been 
weak, the U.S. federal government as a whole has attempted to improve its defensive 
cybersecurity capabilities. In July, 2015, the Obama administration supported private sector 
efforts to improve cybersecurity; expanded public-private partnerships and efforts in 
information security; and pushed for legislation on information sharing and breach notification 
laws. On the federal cybersecurity front, the administration vastly accelerated cybersecurity 
efforts through the emphasis and adoption of more secure technologies and expanded 
capabilities; began a cross-agency effort to examine the background investigation process; and 
sought to improve the development of the workforce in information security matters through 
the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education. The administration also took measures to 
better “identify, defend against, and counter malicious cyber actors” and engage internationally 
on cybersecurity issues with both global partners and NATO.210 In February 2016, the Obama 
administration proposed the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) to “near-term actions 
and puts in place a long-term strategy to enhance cybersecurity awareness and protections, 
protect privacy, maintain public safety as well as economic and national security, and empower 
Americans to take better control of their digital security.”211 
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4.3.2. Trump Administration Continuity 
 The Trump administration has stayed consistent with the Obama administration in 
focusing on strengthening the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical infrastructure. In 
May 2017, President Trump issued an Executive Order 13800 outlining concrete steps to 
improve cybersecurity. First, the Executive Order requires agency heads to utilize the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure (completed as a result an Executive Order signed by President Obama in 2013);212 
directs agency heads to produce cybersecurity risk reports to both the leadership of the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Management and Budget; and prioritizes 
the policy to “build and maintain a modern, secure, and more resilient executive branch IT 
architecture.”213 Second, the Executive Order 13800 directs agencies to support the security 
efforts of critical infrastructure entities at the greatest risk of attacks and mandates investigation 
and reporting on critical infrastructure threats. Third, focusing on “Cybersecurity for the 
Nation,” Executive Order 13800 directs several executive branch leaders to submit a report on 
strategic options for cyber deterrence; directs executive branch leaders to submit a report on 
international cybersecurity priorities; and identify workforce development opportunities to 
“ensure that the United States maintains a long-term cybersecurity advantage.”214 
Unfortunately, as deadlines detailed in the Executive Order approached late last year, the 
reports directed by Executive Order 13800 failed to materialize, suggesting ambitious goals but 
lagging efforts from the current administration in the space.215 
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4.4. Recommendations for Future Cybersecurity Preparedness 
With federal government efforts from the past five years in consideration, the following 
five recommendations include both near-term efforts to combat immediate problems OPM faces 
and long-term efforts to improve the agency’s cybersecurity strategy overall. They attempt to 
address many of the structural management issues plaguing OPM while also enhancing the 
agency’s technical capabilities in detecting and mitigating cyber intrusions or cyberattacks. 
The first recommendation focuses on the “catch up” game; the second recommendation 
centers on a continuous-improvement process as suggested by the National Institutes of 
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) cybersecurity framework; the third recommendation seeks 
to ensure that OPM’s contractor relationships have the proper credentials and access 
management to prevent the possibility of a stolen credential being used in a breach again; the 
fourth recommendation suggests restructuring information technology security training 
programs to better verify the training progress of OPM’s employees; and finally, the fifth 
recommendation includes the possibility of developing public-private partnerships to improve 
OPM’s technical capabilities.  
Recommendation 1: Prioritize Implementation of Oldest Open OIG FISMA Recommendations 
The Director of OPM and the Office of the Chief Information Officer should work 
with all relevant program offices to prioritize the necessary resources, time, and 
personnel to implement all Inspector General FISMA audit recommendations that have 
been open for two years or more before the issuance of the OIG’s FY 2018 FISMA audit. 
Prioritizing these 16 open recommendations (as of March 30, 2018) would improve 
historically problematic recommendation categories for OPM, such as information 
security continuous monitoring; risk management; and identity, credential, and access 
management. 
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Recommendation 2: Develop Security Best Practices through Continuous Improvement 
The Director of OPM and the Office of the Chief Information Officer should draft and 
publish a draft strategy document developing a set of best practices focused on best-
demonstrated continuous-improvement processes as documented in the latest revision 
of the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, including the key 
functions of identification of; protection from; detection of; response to; and recovery 
from cyber espionage, cyber breaches, cyberattack, and other malicious cyber activities, 
by the end of FY 2018. 
Recommendation 3: Evolve the Contractor Relationship 
The Director of OPM and all related program offices should act to facilitate an 
evolution in the contractor relationship to better manage the risks associated with 
contractors providing key services for the agency. These actions should include, as a 
baseline, improved identity verification; consolidated credential management; and more 
granular access management. These new policies should be published by the end of FY 
2018 and enacted either by the end of FY 2018 or the next OPM contractor services 
agreement following policy publication, whichever is sooner. 
Recommendation 4: Restructure IT Security Training Programs 
The Director of OPM and the Office of the Chief Information Officer, working with 
all relevant OPM program offices, should publish findings on all agency security 
training efforts, including all cybersecurity-related education curricula, training 
percentage rates, and training retention; report these findings to the OIG in a timely 
manner; and develop and restructure IT security training programs accordingly to 
maximize training effectiveness and concept retention among all OPM employees and 
contractors.  
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Recommendation 5: Develop Public-Private Partnerships for Information Sharing 
The Director of OPM, in a cross-agency effort with all other executive branch offices and 
FISMA-designated cybersecurity response agencies, should author and publish a report 
on public-private partnerships for cybersecurity information sharing and incident 
response within 180 days and develop an actionable timeline for working with the 
private sector entities identified in the report within 180 days of the report’s release.   
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Conclusion 
 The OPM data breach was the worst publicly known cyber incident to befall the U.S. 
federal government in recent memory. The massive losses from the breach--including 4.2 
million former and current federal employee personnel records, 21.5 million background checks 
for national security positions, and 5.6 million sets of fingerprints--stemmed from a 
sophisticated, multi-stage cyber espionage operation linked to state-sponsored actors. Such a 
large data breach invited bipartisan criticism of the agency’s handling of the incidents and 
thrust the federal government’s cybersecurity preparedness into the limelight. 
 What happened to OPM was actually a set of cybersecurity breaches from skilled 
attackers that exploited a combination of technical vulnerabilities present in OPM’s systems. 
These technical weaknesses were only magnified by management woes: a lack of information 
technology leadership from the agency, missed warning signs, inadequate implementation of 
technically feasible security measures, poor contractor management, and data management 
policy issues. Furthermore, a historical analysis of OPM’s FISMA compliance from 2007 to 2017 
suggest that the agency had lagged behind in implementing many recommendations that could 
have improved its cybersecurity posture. In fact, the data show that in the years since the OPM 
breach, the agency’s IT security compliance issues have only gotten worse. 
In the United States, cybersecurity is an issue that bridges the political divide, with both 
bipartisan attention paid to the issue and support for the improvement of cybersecurity and IT 
infrastructure within the Federal government. Both the Obama and Trump administrations 
have emphasized the importance of strengthening the nation’s cybersecurity capabilities to 
avoid breaches such as the one that befell OPM and have detailed policy initiatives to involve a 
broad base of stakeholders, including cross-agency efforts and the private sector. Following this 
trajectory, the recommendations proposed in this thesis are made with the hope that, if 
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followed, OPM can successfully grapple with its historic information technology management 
weaknesses, adopt a continuous improvement framework in thinking about cybersecurity, and 
ensure that future breaches of its sensitive databases never occur again. 
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Appendix I: OPM Organizational Chart 
 
Source:  U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Annual Performance Report: Fiscal Year 2017,” OPM.gov, February 
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Appendix II: Historical Dataset of OPM OIG FISMA Recommendations 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL AVG LIFE (YEARS) 
Total 
Recommendations 9 19 34 41 29 18 16 29 27 26 39 287 2.7871032 
New 
Recommendations 9 17 24 16 23 10 4 19 6 9 18 155 1.6673442 
Rollover 
Recommendations 0 2 10 25 6 8 12 10 21 17 21 132 
 
Year Closed 0 6 8 9 37 21 8 6 10 6 5 116 1.5228389 
Closed (Orig Year) 9 16 24 16 22 8 3 9 5 4 0 116 1.5228389 
% Closed (Orig 
Year) 100% 84% 71% 39% 76% 44% 19% 31% 19% 15% 0% 
  
Closed (By Year 
Closed) 0 6 8 9 37 21 8 6 10 6 5 116 
 
% Closed (of total 
closed, by year 
closed) 
0% 5% 7% 8% 32% 18% 7% 5% 9% 5% 4%   
Open 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 10 1 5 18 39 2.0971549 
Total Recs YoY 0% 111% 79% 21% -29% -38% -11% 81% -7% -4% 50% 8%  
New Recs YoY 0% 89% 41% -33% 44% -57% -60% 375% -68% 50% 100% 1%  
Rollover Recs YoY 0% 0% 400% 150% -76% 33% 50% -17% 110% -19% 24% 30%  
Closed Recs YoY 0% 0% 33% 13% 311% -43% -62% -25% 67% -40% -17% -2%  
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CATEGORIES - ALL 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
AVG LIFE 
(YEARS) % RECS 
Agency Privacy Program 2 1 7 4 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 20 3.7667123 7% 
Configuration 
Management 
1 4 8 10 5 3 3 8 7 8 11 68 2.6260677 24% 
Contingency Planning 1 0 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 24 3.3312785 8% 
Identity, Credential, and 
Access Management 
1 1 2 5 7 4 2 3 5 4 5 39 2.1364946 14% 
Incident Response 
Program 
2 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 11 1.9947696 4% 
Information Security 
Continuous Monitoring 
0 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 18 2.008067 6% 
Information Security 
Governance 
2 1 5 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 1 23 4.0958904 8% 
Risk Management 0 5 5 6 3 3 3 6 4 2 12 49 2.6886777 17% 
Security Assessment and 
Authorization 
0 2 4 7 2 0 0 3 3 3 2 26 3.0807165 9% 
Security Training 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 9 2.0645358 3% 
TOTAL 9 19 34 41 29 18 16 29 27 26 39 287 2.7871032  
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CATEGORIES - ALL 
UNIQUE 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
AVG LIFE 
(YEARS) % RECS 
Agency Privacy Program 2 1 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 1.837609 7% 
Configuration 
Management 
1 4 6 3 4 2 2 6 1 1 4 34 1.7693795 22% 
Contingency Planning 1 0 2 0 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 9 2.235312 6% 
Identity, Credential, and 
Access Management 
1 1 2 4 5 3 0 1 1 1 3 22 1.2603985 14% 
Incident Response 
Program 
2 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 9 0.8961948 6% 
Information Security 
Continuous Monitoring 
0 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 12 1.5678082 8% 
Information Security 
Governance 
2 0 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 0 11 2.3312578 7% 
Risk Management 0 5 3 1 3 2 1 4 1 2 6 28 1.7618395 18% 
Security Assessment and 
Authorization 
0 2 2 3 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 12 1.7979452 8% 
Security Training 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 0.969863 5% 
TOTAL 9 17 24 16 23 10 4 19 6 9 18 155   
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CATEGORIES - ROLLOVER 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
AVG LIFE 
(YEARS) % RECS 
Agency Privacy Program 0 0 2 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 9 8.3704718 7% 
Configuration 
Management 
0 0 2 7 1 1 1 2 6 7 7 34 5.2521354 26% 
Contingency Planning 0 0 1 3 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 15 5.3300457 11% 
Identity, Credential, and 
Access Management 
0 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 4 3 2 17 4.9013699 13% 
Incident Response 
Program 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 10.971233 2% 
Information Security 
Continuous Monitoring 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6.0242009 5% 
Information Security 
Governance 
0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 12 7.8504566 9% 
Risk Management 0 0 2 5 0 1 2 2 3 0 6 21 6.2735812 16% 
Security Assessment and 
Authorization 
0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 3 3 2 14 5.7213307 11% 
Security Training 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 9.290411 2% 
TOTAL 0 2 10 25 6 8 12 10 21 17 21 132 6.0598381  
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UNIQUE CATEGORIES 
- BY YEAR OPEN 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
AVG LIFE 
(YEARS) % RECS 
Agency Privacy 
Program 
2 1 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 1.837609 9% 
Configuration 
Management 
1 4 6 3 4 2 2 1 0 0 0 23 1.64324 20% 
Contingency 
Planning 
1 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1.8191781 5% 
Identity, Credential, 
and Access 
Management 
1 1 2 4 5 2 0 1 1 0 0 17 1.1574537 15% 
Incident Response 
Program 
2 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 9 0.8961948 8% 
Information Security 
Continuous 
Monitoring 
0 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 9 0.9388128 8% 
Information Security 
Governance 
2 0 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 10 2.4257534 9% 
Risk Management 0 5 3 1 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 16 1.657363 14% 
Security Assessment 
and Authorization 
0 2 2 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 10 1.4813699 9% 
Security Training 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 1.1890411 4% 
TOTAL 9 16 24 16 22 8 3 9 5 4 0 116   
 
  
 115 
UNIQUE CATEGORIES 
- BY YEAR CLOSED 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
AVG LIFE 
(YEARS) % RECS 
Agency Privacy 
Program 
0 1 0 4 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 11 1.837609 9% 
Configuration 
Management 
0 1 1 1 10 4 2 2 1 1 0 23 1.64324 20% 
Contingency 
Planning 
0 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 6 1.8191781 5% 
Identity, Credential, 
and Access 
Management 
0 1 1 1 4 5 2 1 1 1 0 17 1.1574537 15% 
Incident Response 
Program 
0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 1 9 0.8961948 8% 
Information Security 
Continuous 
Monitoring 
0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 9 0.9388128 8% 
Information Security 
Governance 
0 0 0 2 4 1 0 0 1 1 1 10 2.4257534 9% 
Risk Management 0 0 2 0 7 2 1 1 1 2 0 16 1.657363 14% 
Security Assessment 
and Authorization 
0 0 1 1 5 2 0 0 0 0 1 10 1.4813699 9% 
Security Training 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 1.1890411 4% 
TOTAL 0 6 8 9 37 21 8 6 10 6 5 116   
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UNIQUE CATEGORIES 
- OPEN 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL 
AVG LIFE 
(YEARS) % RECS 
Agency Privacy 
Program 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Configuration 
Management 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 1 4 11 2.0331258 28% 
Contingency 
Planning 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 3.0675799 8% 
Identity, Credential, 
and Access 
Management 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 5 1.610411 13% 
Incident Response 
Program 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Information Security 
Continuous 
Monitoring 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3.4547945 8% 
Information Security 
Governance 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1.3863014 3% 
Risk Management 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 6 12 1.9011416 31% 
Security Assessment 
and Authorization 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 3.3808219 5% 
Security Training 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0.4219178 5% 
TOTAL 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 10 1 5 18 39   
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Appendix III: Recommendations for OPM 
Recommendation 1: Prioritize Implementation of Oldest Open OIG FISMA Recommendations 
The Director of OPM and the Office of the Chief Information Officer should work 
with all relevant program offices to prioritize the necessary resources, time, and 
personnel to implement all Inspector General FISMA audit recommendations that have 
been open for two years or more before the issuance of the OIG’s FY 2018 FISMA audit. 
Prioritizing these 16 open recommendations (as of March 30, 2018) would improve 
historically problematic recommendation categories for OPM, such as information 
security continuous monitoring; risk management; and identity, credential, and access 
management. 
 
Recommendation 2: Develop Security Best Practices through Continuous Improvement  
The Director of OPM and the Office of the Chief Information Officer should draft and 
publish a draft strategy document developing a set of best practices focused on best-
demonstrated continuous-improvement processes as documented in the latest revision 
of the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, including the key 
functions of identification of; protection from; detection of; response to; and recovery 
from cyber espionage, cyber breaches, cyberattack, and other malicious cyber activities, 
by the end of FY 2018. 
 
Recommendation 3: Evolve the Contractor Relationship 
The Director of OPM and all related program offices should act to facilitate an 
evolution in the contractor relationship to better manage the risks associated with 
contractors providing key services for the agency. These actions should include, as a 
baseline, improved identity verification; consolidated credential management; and more 
granular access management. These new policies should be published by the end of FY 
2018 and enacted either by the end of FY 2018 or the next OPM contractor services 
agreement following policy publication, whichever is sooner. 
 
Recommendation 4: Restructure IT Security Training Programs 
The Director of OPM and the Office of the Chief Information Officer, working with 
all relevant OPM program offices, should publish findings on all agency security 
training efforts, including all cybersecurity-related education curricula, training 
percentage rates, and training retention; report these findings to the OIG in a timely 
manner; and develop and restructure IT security training programs accordingly to 
maximize training effectiveness and concept retention among all OPM employees and 
contractors.  
 
Recommendation 5: Develop Public-Private Partnerships for Information Sharing 
The Director of OPM, in a cross-agency effort with all other executive branch offices and 
FISMA-designated cybersecurity response agencies, should author and publish a report 
on public-private partnerships for cybersecurity information sharing and incident 
response within 180 days and develop an actionable timeline for working with the 
private sector entities identified in the report within 180 days of the report’s release. 
  
 118 
About the Author 
Zeyi Lin was born in Nanjing, China on June 14, 1995, and moved with his family to 
Austin, Texas in 2001. He enrolled in the Plan II Honors program at the University of Texas at 
Austin in 2013 and concurrently studied Electrical and Computer Engineering and 
Government. In college, he was actively involved with the Society of Plan II Engineers and the 
Texas Blazers, a service, spirit, and leadership organization. He was selected as a University of 
Texas System Archer Fellow and interned in the Obama-era White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy in the fall of 2015. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa and as a College of Liberal 
Arts Dean’s Distinguished Graduate in May 2018. Mr. Lin will intern with the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers as a Technology Policy Analyst in Washington, D.C., this 
summer and plans to join Bain & Company as an Associate Consultant this fall. 
